Formal verification of a concurrent binary search tree by Chen, Xiwen
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF A CONCURRENT BINARY SEARCH 
TREE 
XIWEN CHEN 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
AUGUST 2013 
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF A 
CONCURRENT BINARY SEARCH TREE 
by Xiwen Chen 
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of 
York University in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
© 2013 
Permission has been granted to: a) YORK UNIVER-
SITY LIBRARIES to lend or sell copies of this disserta-
tion in paper, microform or electronic formats, and b) 
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA to reproduce, 
lend, distribute, or sell copies of this thesis anywhere in 
the world in microform, paper or electronic formats and 
to authorise or procure the reproduction, loan, distribu-
tion or sale of copies of this thesis anywhere in the world 
in microform, paper or electronic formats. 
The author reserves other publication rights, and neither 
the thesis nor extensive extracts for it may be printed or 
otherwise reproduced without the author's written per-
mission. 
Abstract 
In this thesis, we formally verify a simplified version of the non-blocking lineariz-
able binary search tree of Ellen et al., which appeared in the Proceedings of the 29th 
Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (pages 131-140), 
using the PVS specification and verification system. The algorithm and its speci-
fication are both modelled as 1/0 automata. In order to formally verify that the 
algorithm implements the specification, we show that the algorithm's 1/0 automa-
ton simulates the specification's. An intermediate 1/0 automaton is constructed 
to simplify the simulation proof of linearizability. By showing there is a forward 
simulation from the algorithm's 1/0 automaton to the intermediate automaton and 
there is a backward simulation from the intermediate automaton to the specifica-
tion's automaton, we formally verify that the algorithm implements its specification. 
While formalizing the proof, we found small errors in the original proof. 
iv 
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1 Introduction 
With the arrival of the multi-core central processing unit (CPU) revolution, a consid-
erable fraction of the applications developed today is concurrent. "But concurrency 
is hard. Not only are today's languages and tools inadequate to transform appli-
cations into parallel programs, but also it is difficult to find parallelism in main 
stream applications, and-worst of all-concurrency requires programmers to think 
in a way humans find difficult", as Microsoft's Herb Sutter and James Larus wrote 
in 2005 [l]. Unfortunately, almost a decade later, the above quote still reflects the 
current state of affairs in the field of software development. 
Since concurrency is hard, libraries with concurrency primitives such as a concur-
rent array, a concurrent queue and a concurrent set are essential for today's software 
developer. Such concurrency primitives provide objects that can be accessed con-
currently by multiple processes. One popular way of specifying correctness of such a 
concurrent object is linearizability. This means that it behaves as if operations on it 
occur instantaneously. For example, to design a concurrent algorithm that stores a 
searchable set that can be updated by insert and delete operations, which is a very 
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common scenario, a concurrent implementation of binary search trees will be very 
helpful. 
It has been a long time since researchers realized that traditional approaches, 
which are based on mutual exclusion, are often not efficient enough and have associ-
ated problems such as deadlock, livelock and convoying. To combat these problems, 
they developed concurrent objects that do not rely on mutual exclusion mechanisms 
such as locks and semaphores. Lock-free implementations, which avoid mutual ex-
clusion using other techniques to coordinate access by different processes to shared 
data, provide high parallelism and good performance under a variety of different 
workloads. There are several different progress properties that a lock-free algorithm 
can satisfy. The wait-free property [2] ensures that any process can complete any 
operation in a finite number of steps, regardless of the execution speeds of the other 
processes. The non-blocking property guarantees that some operation will com-
plete in a finite number of steps. This weaker condition allows individual processes 
to starve but guarantees system-wide progress. All wait-free algorithms are non-
blocking. The terms non-blocking and lock-free are often used interchangeably. We 
use non-blocking as a term to specify algorithms that satisfy this progress condi-
tion and use lock-free as a general term to describe algorithms that do not rely on 
mutual exclusion. Lock-free algorithms are generally more complex than lock-based 
algorithms, because intricate parallelism techniques are introduced to avoid locks. 
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Recently, Ellen et al. [3) gave a non-blocking linearizable implementation of a 
binary search tree. They provided a proof of correctness written in English which was 
quite lengthy and complex. The goal of our work is to provide a formal verification 
of this proof. 
1.1 Formal Verification 
Since concurrency is hard, it should come as no surprise that concurrent algorithms 
are prone to errors. Therefore, there are significant challenges to ensure the correct-
ness of concurrent algorithms in general, and lock-free algorithms in particular. For 
example, Detlefs et al. [4) developed a lock-free double-ended queue, called the Snark 
algorithm, with a proof of correctness, but bugs were reported later by Doherty [5). 
Shann et al. [6) published their non-blocking queue algorithm with safety proofs, 
but bugs were found when formal verification methods were applied by Colvin and 
Groves in [7). 
Although it is hard to avoid bugs in an algorithm, there are a variety of methods 
to reduce the chance of making a mistake. Testing is one such method to detect 
bugs. However, testing all executions of a nontrivial concurrent algorithm is usually 
infeasible (or even impossible) because there are simply too many. Formal verifica-
tion is another method of checking whether a design satisfies some properties. It 
is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of algorithms with respect to a 
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certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. The 
two main approaches are model checking and theorem proving. 
Model checking builds a mathematical model of the algorithm as a collection of 
states and actions that move from one state to another. Then, a model checker per-
forms a systematic, exhaustive exploration of the state space, for example to check 
that an invariant is true in all reachable states. Lamport [8) described a way to ver-
ify concurrent algorithms using the +CAL algorithm language and the TCL model 
checker and successfully detected the bugs in the Snark algorithm found by Do-
herty et al. [9]. He translated the algorithm into the +CAL algorithm language and 
then to a TLA+ specification that can be model checked. Liu et al. [10] presented 
their way to check linearizability based on refinement relations from abstract speci-
fications to concrete implementations using model checking methods. Their method 
exploits model checking of finite state systems specified as concurrent processes with 
shared variables, and partial order reduction is applied to reduce the search space. 
The toolset they used can automatically check a variety of algorithms. However, 
no tree implementation has been verified in their paper and the tool has not been 
published. The approaches that use model checking techniques can help us quickly 
discover bugs in some algorithms. However, for complicated concurrent algorithms, 
the search spaces are usually too large to be explored in a reasonable amount of 
time and using a reasonable amount of space. 
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Theorem proving (also called deductive reasoning), is the proving of mathemat-
ical theorems in a format so that the proof can be checked by a computer program 
such as PVS, Coq, HOL or Isabelle. Theorem proving is more powerful than model 
checking because it can deal with an infinite state space more easily. Because the 
binary search tree of Ellen et al. [3] is a data structure of unbounded keys, and pro-
cesses, the state space is infinite. So, we use the PVS theorem prover to formalize 
the binary search tree's proof of correctness. 
PVS is a verification system that contains a specification language and a theorem 
prover. We used this verification system in our proofs. Compared with other theo-
rem proving systems, such as HOL and Isabelle, PVS has several advantages. First, 
its specification language allows the user to define things in a way that is similar 
to programming languages. For instance, we can define a data type using square 
brackets and specify its fields' names and types. We can also define data types 
by explicitly writing datatype, and PVS then automatically generates basic axioms 
for it. Hence, having such a specification language, we can easily formalize pseu-
docode using PVS and focus on proving correctness. Second, unlike HOL, the PVS 
theorem prover allows users to define their axioms, which provides more freedom 
to construct proofs based on some facts without getting stuck on low level details. 
However, because introducing user defined axioms may introduce inconsistencies, 
axioms must be very carefully designed. Third, PVS also provides some automatic 
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reasoning procedures such as grind, assert and bddsimp etc., which simplify the task 
of proving correctness. 
1.2 Previous Work 
Lynch and Tuttle [11] introduced 1/0 automata (IOA), which can be used to model 
concurrent algorithms and specifications of correctness. To prove that an algorithm 
correctly implements a specification, one has to show that for every execution of 
the algorithm's automaton, the externally observable behaviour is the same as the 
behaviour of the specification automaton. Lynch and Vaandrager [12] introduced 
techniques for doing this, including forward simulations and backward simulations. 
In Doherty's Master's thesis [5], he introduced a way to use the PVS theo-
rem prover to check the forward simulation between the Snark algorithm [4] and 
its specification, and detected bugs in the algorithm. A canonical automaton was 
introduced there to model the specification and capture the property of lineariz-
ability. Then, a forward simulation was used to show that the automaton of the 
concurrent implementation simulates the canonical automaton, thus showing that 
the implementation is linearizable. (We shall discuss this technique in more detail 
in Chapter 2.) While the author was trying to prove the correctness of the Snark 
algorithm using a forward simulation, he detected bugs. He also showed how to fix 
those bugs, and mentioned that a backward simulation might be needed to complete 
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the proof. The complete verification of this algorithm was done later in [9). 
Doherty et al. [13) used a similar method to verify a queue that is slightly op-
timized from Michael and Scott's non-blocking FIFO queue [14) using the PVS 
theorem prover. In this paper, they formally described a way to verify the non-
blocking algorithm using simulation techniques. Their idea was to introduce three 
IOAs: an abstract one which was the same as the canonical automaton, an interme-
diate one and a concrete one which represented the implementation. A backward 
simulation was proved between the abstract IOA and the intermediate IOA, and a 
forward simulation was verified between the intermediate IOA and the concrete IOA. 
This technique was also used in [9] to complete the proof of the correctness of the 
modified Snark algorithm. More details about the relationship between backward 
simulations and non-blocking algorithms are also discussed in [15]. 
Colvin et al. [7] used this method (i.e., using three IOAs) to prove the correct-
ness of an array-based non-blocking implementation of a bounded queue by Shann 
et al. [6] and also detected errors in the algorithm. After they fixed that algorithm, 
they successfully formally verified the modified version using PVS. 
In later work of Colvin et al. [16], they used this hybrid forward and backward 
simulation technique to verify a lazy concurrent list-based set algorithm [17]. Al-
though this algorithm is based on locks, one of its operations (a contain operation) 
has the wait-freedom property. 
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Although many concurrent algorithms manipulating arrays, queues and lists have 
been formally verified, no one has tried to formally verify non-blocking binary search 
tree algorithms so far. Hence, our goal is to formally verify the non-blocking binary 
search tree algorithm discovered by Ellen et al. [3]. Our idea of how to formally 
verify the algorithm was inspired by Colvin et al. [16]. 
Many people have formally verified concurrent algorithms using the PVS theorem 
prover. Gao used PVS to prove the correctness and progress properties of a lock-
free dynamic hash table in his Ph.D. thesis [18]. In his thesis, he also proved the 
correctness of a lock-free parallel garbage collector using PVS. Archer et al. [19] 
described a general way to model concurrent algorithms as timed I/O automata 
using the Tempo toolkits [20] and then verify the properties of the I/O automata in 
PVS through the interface TAME [21, 22]. 
1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we first introduce our model of computation in Chapter 2. For a 
data type, we define its sequential executions, atomic executions and concurrent 
executions. Once, an implementation of a data type is modelled by means of an I/O 
automaton, simulations are used to prove the correctness of its executions. 
Chapter 3 presents the non-blocking binary search tree algorithm of Ellen et al. [3]. 
We give an overview of how this algorithm works and then explain some key steps 
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of that algorithm. A simplified algorithm is given later in this chapter to make our 
proofs easier. 
In Chapter 4, the details of modelling the binary search tree algorithm are pre-
sented. Then, we define a forward simulation and a backward simulation in order 
to prove the correctness of the algorithm. Chapter 5 discusses the proofs for the 
forward and backward simulation. The difficulties and bugs that we detected dur-
ing the formal verification using PVS are also discussed there. Chapter 6 gives a 
summary and describes some of the future work we would like to pursue. 
9 
2 Proving Linearizability Using Simulations 
2.1 Model of Computation 
To model data types and algorithms in a shared-memory architecture, we use an 
asynchronous shared-memory model. In the asynchronous model, different processes 
take steps in an arbitrary order, at arbitrary relative speeds. Intuitively, in the 
asynchronous model, we assume there is a scheduler that determines which process 
will take the next step. Algorithms and data structures should behave correctly for 
all possible schedules made by that scheduler. Our model allows failures to model 
the fact that the systems in which the algorithms are running may not be completely 
reliable. Therefore, programs need to tolerate faulty behaviour. We consider crash 
failures: a process executing some code may stop without a warning. (These are 
also known as halting failures.) 
In a shared-memory model, a collection of processes interact with one another via 
a collection of shared objects [23]. Such an assumption captures the way commu-
nication occurs in a multi-core CPU. We assume our system provides some atomic 
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shared objects, either implemented in hardware or by the operating system. Atomic 
objects can be accessed concurrently by several processes, but they ensure that each 
operation performed by the processes occurs atomically. For example, read/write 
registers are one of the most frequently used types of shared objects in concurrent 
systems. A read/write register stores a value. A write( v) operation changes the 
value to v and returns ack. A read operation returns the value currently stored 
in the read/write register without changing it. Both write and read operations are 
atomic. Compare-and-swap is also a popular type of atomic object in multi-core 
systems. A compare-and-swap (GAS) object X stores a value from a universe U, 
and provides only one operation, CAS(u, v), where u and v are in U. A CAS(u, v) 
on object X successfully writes v into X if and only if the value previously stored 
in X is equal to u. Otherwise, CAS(u, v) does nothing to the value stored in X. 
Whether it succeeds or fails, CAS(u, v) returns the old value of X. We present a 
formal way to describe the model we discussed here in Section 2.3. 
2.2 Data Types 
If we wish to use more complex data structures than those provided by the system, 
we must implement them in software. In order to describe the correctness of a 
concurrent implementation of a data type, Herlihy and Wing [24] defined a property 
called linearizability. It ensures that every operation on the concurrent objects 
11 
appears to take effect atomically at some point between its invocation and response. 
Before we formally define linearizability, we introduce the definition of a sequential 
specification of a data type, adapted from [23, Chapter 9.4). 
Definition 2.1. A data type is a tuple (V, v0 , I, R, J) consisting of 
• a set V of values, 
• an initial value v0 E V, 
• a set I of invocations, 
• a set R of responses, and 
• a function f: V x I ---+ R x V. 
Intuitively, an object of type (V, v0 , I, R, !) stores a value from V and starts 
with the initial value v0 . If an invocation inv E I is performed when the object's 
value is v EV, then f(v,inv) = (res,v') describes the outcome of the invocation: 
the object's value is changed to v' and the object returns tp.e response res. For 
simplicity, we restrict data types to behave deterministically here. This covers most 
data types encountered in practice. 
A data type can be manipulated by either one process or a set of processes. We 
define a sequential execution of a data type by only one process in Definition 2.2. 
12 
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Definition 2.2. A sequential execution of a data type (V, v0 , I, R, !) is a finite se-
quence (v0, inv1, res1, v1, inv2, res2, · · · , vk), such that for all 0::; j < k, f(vj, invi+i) = 
(resj+1, Vj+1). 
We denote the empty sequence by E and use o to denote concatenation of se-
quences. Using the definition of sequential executions of a data type, we can define 
the notion of a sequential trace of a data type. A trace is also called a history by 
Herlihy and Wing [24]. 
Definition 2.3. The trace of a sequential execution is defined inductively as follows: 
• trace(E) = E, and 
• trace( (v, inv, resp)oE) = (inv, resp)otrace(E), for any execution (v, inv, resp)o 
E. 
A sequence is a sequential trace of a data type if it is the trace of some sequential 
execution of that data type. Here, we give an example of a fetch and increment 
(fetch&inc) data type. A fetch&inc data type stores an integer value and provides 
only one type of operation. It atomically performs the following three small steps: 
(1) read the integer value of the object and store it to a local variable val; (2) 
increase the object's value by 1; (3) return val. More formally, the specification of 
a fetch&inc data type is shown in Definition 2.4. 
Definition 2.4. A fetch&inc data type is defined as follows: 
13 
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• V=N, 
• Vo= 0, 
• I= {Ji}, 
• R = {fiResp(n) I n EN}, and 
• J(v, Ji) = (fiResp( v), v + 1), for any v E V. 
For instance, a Jetch&inc data type may have a sequential execution: 
Es = (0, Ji, J iResp(O), 1, f i, f iResp(l), 2, f i, fiResp(2), 3, Ji, JiResp(3), 4). 
The trace Ts corresponding to Es is: 
Ts= (Ji, JiResp(O), Ji, fiResp(l), Ji, JiResp(2), Ji, JiResp(3)). 
A data type can also be concurrently manipulated by a finite set of processes 
P ROG. Its executions, known as atomic executions, are defined in Definition 2.5. 
Definition 2.5. An atomic execution of a data type (V, v0 , I, R, !) manipulated by 
a set of processes PROG is a finite sequence (v0, (inv1,P1), (res1,p1), v1, (inv2,P2), 
(res2,P2), ... , vk) such that for all 0::; j < k, J(vj, invi+1) = (resi+1, vi+1) and for 
all 1 ::; j ::; k, Pi E P ROG. 
For instance, an atomic execution of a data type among processes p, q and r may 
look like: 
Ea = (vo, ( inv, p), (res, p), v1 , ( inv, r), (res, r), v2, ( inv, q), (res, q), v3). 
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Or, we can put processes as subscripts for a more compact representation. 
The definition of the atomic trace can also be defined by applying Definition 2.3. 
Hence, atomic traces are the trace of atomic executions of a data type. For instance, 
the trace of Ea is: 
The invocation and the matching response by p compose a complete operation of p. 
For each invocation by process p, the matching response is the next response by p. 
Intuitively, in an atomic trace, each response of a process p is immediately preceded 
by a matching invocation of p. 
An example of an atomic execution on a fetch&inc object manipulated by pro-
cesses p, q, and r is shown below. 
Its atomic trace is: 
Besides sequential executions and atomic executions, there are concurrent execu-
tions of implementations of data types. We define concurrent executions and traces 
after introducing I/O automata. 
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2.3 Input/Output Automata 
The input/ output (I/ 0) automaton is a formal model for asynchronous comput-
ing [23]. It is a powerful and general model that is suitable for describing almost 
any type of asynchronous concurrent system. An 1/0 automaton is a simple type 
of state machine in which the transitions are associated with named actions, which 
are classified as external or internal. Following the definitions given by Lynch 
and Tuttle [11] and Doherty [5], external actions, which are visible to the outside 
world, are further classified according to whether they model invocation (input) or 
response (output) events. On the other hand, internal actions are visible only to 
the automaton itself. Given three disjoint sets in, out, and int of input, output and 
internal actions, respectively, we use the triple (in, out, int) as an action signature 
S. We denote the sets in, out, and int of the action signature S by in(S), out(S), 
and int(S), respectively. Furthermore, we define the external actions, ext(S), to be 
in(S) U out(S); acts(S) to be all the actions of S. 
Definition 2.6. An input/ output automaton A consists of four components, 
1. a set states( A) of states, 
2. a non-empty set start(A) ~ states(A) of start states, 
3. an action signature sig(A), and 
4. a transition relation trans(A) ~ states(A) x acts(sig(A)) x states(A). 
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We use acts(A) as shorthand for acts(sig(A)), and similarly for in(A), and so 
on. We call an element (s,7r,s') of trans(A) a transition of A. The transition 
( s, 7r, s') is called an input transition, output transition or internal transition, based 
on ·whether the action 7r is an input action, output action or internal action. When 
(s, 7r, s') E trans( A), we writes ~A s', or s ~ s' when no confusion is possible. 
Ifs ~A s' we refer to s as the pre-state of the transition, and s' as the post-state. 
Now we present some definitions related to I/ 0 automata, mainly adapted from 
Doherty [5]. 
Definition 2. 7. For any I/ 0 automaton A: 
l. An execution fragment of A is a finite sequence a = ( s0 , 7r1, s 1 , 7r2 , s2, · · · , 7rk, sk) 
of alternating states and actions of A such that (si, 'lri+i, si+1) is a transition 
of A for all 0 ~ i < k. If such a finite execution fragment exists, we write 
so~ A Sk, or s0 ~ sk when no confusion is possible. 
2. An execution of A is a finite execution fragment whose first state s0 is m 
start(A). We denote the set of executions of A by execs(A). 
3. For an execution a of A, trace(a) is the sequence a restricted to external 
actions of the automaton A. 
4. The set traces( A) is the set of traces of executions of A. 
17 
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2.3.1 Concurrent Implementations and Linearizability 
Intuitively, a concurrent implementation of a data type specifies a program that can 
be executed by each process p E P ROG to perform an operation. This program 
will also specify the result of the operation to be returned to p. More formally, a 
concurrent implementation will be described as an 1/0 automaton, whose external 
actions are invocations and responses of the data type. Since the program that im-
plements an operation may take many steps, those steps are all modelled as internal 
actions. When describing a concurrent implementation using an 1/0 automaton, we 
also put processes as subscripts of the actions in each transition to identify which 
process takes a step. 
Thus, we can formally define concurrent executions and concurrent traces. 
Definition 2.8. A concurrent execution of a concurrent implementation manipu-
lated by a set of processes P ROG is an execution of its 1/0 automaton, in which 
each action has a process as its subscript. 
Definition 2.9. A concurrent trace of a concurrent implementation manipulated 
by a set of processes P ROG is a trace of its 1/0 automaton. 
Because the steps of processes are interleaved by the scheduler, an invocation of 
an operation by one process and its matching response are not guaranteed to be next 
to each other, in the trace of a concurrent implementation. Between an invocation 
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and the matching response made by one process, there may be some invocations 
and responses for other processes. For example, if the set of processes is {p, q, r }, a 
concurrent trace of a data type V may look like: 
process fl flResp(O) fl 
pl.____ _I =======~~~~~~~~~~~· 
q 
fl~1 _______ __,(Resp(3) 
r fl .__I ___ __.I fiResp(J) 
Time 
Figure 2.1: The trace from a finite execution sequence on f etch&inc object by three 
processes: p, q, and r. 
Figure 2.1 shows one possible trace T1 of a concurrent implementation of a 
fetch&inc data type executed by processes p, q and r. The trace of a concurrent data 
type, like Ti, is complicated because of the interleaving of operations by different 
processes. Therefore, we need some properties to identify if a trace is "good" or not. 
Linearizability [24] is such a property which guarantees that each concurrent trace 
is equivalent to some legal atomic trace that satisfies its sequential specification. 
Before formally specifying linearizability, we need to introduce some definitions, 
19 
adapted from [24]. 
Definition 2.10. Given a trace T and a process p, a process subtrace, Tip (T at p), 
is the subsequence of all invocations and responses in T whose process names are p. 
Definition 2.11. Two traces T and T' are equivalent if, for every process p, Tip= 
T'IP· 
Definition 2.12. A trace T of a data type Dis well-formed if, for each process p, 
its subtrace Tip starts with an invocation, and alternates between invocations and 
responses. 
We also define a partial order relation on operations of different processes. Recall 
that an operation e consists of the invocation inv( e) together with the matching 
response res(e) (if it exists). 
Definition 2.13. The irreflexive partial order <r on the operations in trace T, is 
defined by: ei <r ej if and only if res( ei) precedes inv( ej) in T. 
Informally, the irreflexive partial order <r shows a "sequential" relation among 
some operations. Pairs of operations that are not ordered by < T are regarded as 
"concurrent" operations. Straightforwardly, if a trace is atomic, <r becomes a total 
order. Based on the preceding definitions, we define a trace T to be linearizable as 
follows. 
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Definition 2.14. For a trace T', let complete(T') be the maximal subsequence of T' 
consisting of all responses and their matching invocations. A trace Tis linearizable 
with respect to a data type D, if it can be extended (by appending zero or more 
response events) to some trace T' such that: 
Ll: complete(T') is equivalent to some legal atomic trace S, and 
L2: <camplete(T')~<s. 
A pending operation in an execution is an operation without a matching re-
sponse. Intuitively, for each pending operation that takes effect but does not return 
a response, we add the response to obtain T'. For example, in Figure 2.1, the sec-
ond operation made by process p is pending, but it must take effect in trace T1 , 
since that is the only way that process q can return fiResp(3). On the other hand, 
complete(T') excludes those pending operations that have not yet taken effect. As 
described by Herlihy [24], "Ll in Definition 2.14 states that processes act as if they 
were interleaved at the granularity of complete operations. L2 states that this se-
quential interleaving corresponds to the precedence ordering of operations." S is 
called a linearization of T. Note that Ll also implies that subtraces of each process 
in T are well-formed. 
To show linearizability of a trace, we can identify a time within each opera-
tion when the operation can be considered to take effect, namely the linearization 
point, and show that ordering the operations in the concurrent execution by their 
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linearization points gives an equivalent atomic trace. Each operation that has no 
response may or may not be assigned a linearization point. For example, we can 
assign linearization points to T1 as shown in Figure 2.2 so that its corresponding 
legal atomic trace is T0 . Another example of assigning linearization points to a trace 
is illustrated in Figure 2.3(a). Since there is no way to assign linearization points to 
the trace shown in Figure 2.3(b), it is not linearizable. To see why, in any atomic 
trace that preserves the order <complete(T), there is a partial order relation between 
the first operations performed by process q and r (because fiRespq(2) precedes fir 
in T3 ). However, their responses violate the specification of the fetch& inc data type. 
process 
ft ftResp( 0) ft 
p I * I * 
q 
.-------------*~r'iResp( 3) 
ft I 
r 
I fiResp( I) 
Time 
Figure 2.2: Trace T1 of a fetch&inc object with linearization points (shown as 
"stars"). Here, p's second operation took effect but the operation was pending. 
Definition 2.15. A linearizable implementation of a data type V is one whose 
concurrent traces are linearizable. 
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process 
fi fiResp(O) 
p 
* 
fi fiResp( 1) fi fiResp(2) 
q I * I I* I 
fi fiResp(3) 
r I * I 
Time 
Trace T2:(fip(), fiq(), fiRespq(I), fir(), fiq(), fiRespp(O), fiRespr(3), fiRespq(2)) 
(a) 
process 
fi fiResp(O) 
p 
fi fiResp(2) fi fiResp(3) 
q I I I I 
fi fiResp( 1) 
r I I 
Time 
Trace T3:(fip(), fiq(), fiRespq(2), fir(), fiq(), fiRespp(O), fiResp( 1), fiRespq(3)) 
(b) 
Figure 2.3: (a) shows a possible way to assign linearization points (shown as "stars") 
in trace T2 . (b) illustrates an execution that is not linearizable. 
In other words, a concurrent data structure is linearizable if, for each concurrent 
trace of the data type, there is an atomic trace in which every operation returns the 
same result, and non-concurrent operations occur in the same order in the atomic 
trace as in the concurrent trace. 
Definition 2.16. The trace inclusion relation <;:r is defined as follows: for any I/O 
automata A and B, A <;:r B iff traces(A) <;: traces(B). 
An I/O automaton can be viewed as a "black box" from the point of view of a 
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user. What the user sees is just the trace of the automaton's execution. If, for any 
automata A and B, A ~T B, then any (external) behaviour exhibited by A could 
also be exhibited by B. Trace inclusion allows us to identify if one I/O automaton 
specifies the desired external behaviour of another automaton. Section 2.4 describes 
a formal verification technique based on the trace inclusion property between a 
specification automaton and an implementation automaton. 
2.3.2 Canonical Automata 
Doherty [5] described a canonical automaton which is able to capture all linearizable 
traces of the data type D. Doherty proved the traces of any automaton that is a 
linearizable implementation of D will be included in the traces of the canonical 
automaton [5]. 
Recall that an automaton consists of four key parts: states, start states, actions 
and a transition relation. In the canonical automaton CA for a data type D = 
(V, v0 , I, R, f) and a set of processes P ROG, the state consists of a value from V 
and a value of the program counter for each process. Intuitively, a state records the 
current value of an instance of D, and the value of the program counter for process p 
indicates the next action that pis allowed to perform. Start( CA) contains a single 
state where the value is the initial value v0 of D and program counter of each process 
p is set to be idle, indicating that p is ready to perform an invocation. As defined 
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in [5], the canonical automaton's external input actions are invocations of the data 
type coupled with processes. Similarly, each external output action is one of the 
data type's responses together with a process. Thus, we will have the following 
external signature for CA. 
• in(CA) = {invp I inv E I,p E PROC} 
• out( CA)= {respp I resp E R,p E PROC} 
We call in(CA) its invocations, and out(CA) its responses. Internal actions in 
int( CA) which represent the linearization points, apply the update function f of 
V's specification to the value. The transition relation trans( CA) is constructed 
straightforwardly based on states and actions. 
Figure 2.4 shows how we construct states( CA), start( CA), in( CA), out( CA) and 
int( CA), given a set of processes PROC. To guarantee the well-formed property of 
the traces of CA, there are three types of values for the program counter: pc_idle, 
pc_inv and pc_resp. Intuitively, pc_idle indicates that only invocations are allowed 
to be performed, and pc_inv indicates that a process has performed the invocation 
inv and is ·able to execute an internal action. Similarly, pc_resp indicates that the 
response resp is allowed to be returned to a process. 
Because a state of an automaton is usually represented using a Cartesian prod-
uct, we introduce "state variables" [5] to describe each component of it. For example, 
we use a state variable "pep" for each p E P ROG and a state variable "val", where 
pep= 7rp(w2(s)) and val= 7r1(s), for a states Estates( CA). Thus, we have a more 
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states(CA) = V x ITpEPRocPcval, where Pcval = {pc_idle}U{pc_inv: inv E 
1} U {pc_resp: resp ER} 
start( CA) = { v0 } x ITpEPRoc{pc_idle }, where v0 is the initial value of V 
in( CA)= {invp I inv E 1,p E PROC} 
out(CA) = {respP I respE R,pE PROC} 
int( CA)= {do_invp I inv E 1,p E PROC} 
Figure 2.4: The states, start and actions of the canonical automaton CA with 
respect to a data type V and a set of processes P ROG. 
convenient way to describe trans( CA). 
Based on the construction of states( CA), start( CA) and acts( CA), the transition 
relation trans( CA) ~ states( CA) x acts( CA) x states( CA) of the canonical automa-
ton is obvious. We describe trans( CA) as the set of all triples (s, 7r, s') such that 
the state s satisfies the some preconditions before executing the action 7r and the 
states' is obtained from s by updating s according to 7r. When a process's program 
counter is pc_idle, it is able to perform an invocation. After the invocation, it may 
perform an internal action and then a response action may be invoked eventually. 
Whenever an action is performed by p, its program counter is updated to ensure the 
well-formed property. Additionally, when an internal action is executed, the value 
of V in the state of CA is also updated according to the update function f of V. 
Table 2.1 illustrates how we use Pre and Eff to capture the pre-conditions before 
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executing an action and the effects of the action on the state, respectively. Note 
that the effects of each action form a set of parallel assignments. State variables 
that are not mentioned in Eff remain the same. 
Action Pre Eff 
invp pep = pc_idle pep f- pc_inv 
do_invp pep= pc_inv val f- v', pep f- pc_resp, 
val= v where (resp, v') = f(v, inv) 
res pp pep = pc_resp pep f- pc_idle 
Table 2.1: Transitions of a Canonical Automaton. 
In Table 2.1, invp, do_invp and respp all represent actions, where inv E J, resp E 
Rand p E P ROG. The construction of our canonical automaton follows Doherty [5]. 
A slightly different construction is given by [23, Section 13.2]. To show a concrete 
example of constructing a canonical automaton, recall the f etch&inc data type 
described in Definition 2.4. The canonical automaton CF for the fetch&inc data 
type is shown in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.2. 
Linearizability of the Canonical Automaton 
This section proves that all traces of the canonical automaton are well-formed and 
linearizable. The results in this section are fairly straightforward and mainly follow 
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states( CF) = N x ITpEPROC Pcval, where Pcval 
{pc-fiResp(n) I n EN} 
{pc_idle, pc_fi} U 
start(CF) = {O} x ITpEPRoc{pc_idle} 
in(CF) = {fip Ip E PROC} 
out(CF) = {fiResp(n) In E N,p E PROC} 
int(CF) = {do_fip Ip E PROC} 
Figure 2.5: states, start and actions of the canonical automaton CF for the 
fetch& inc data type. 
Action Pre Eff 
fip pep = pc_idle pep +-- pc_fi 
doFip pep= pc_fi pep +-- pc-f iResp( v) 
val= v val+-- v + 1 
fiRespp(n) pep = pc-f iResp( n) pep +-- pc_idle 
Table 2.2: Transitions for the canonical automaton CF of the f etch&inc data type. 
the proofs in [23] and [5]. We assume we have a data type V = (V, v0 ,I, R, !) and 
the canonical automaton CA as described in the preceding construction. 
Recall that a linearizable I/O automaton A should satisfy three properties: its 
external actions must match the invocations and responses of TJ, its traces must be 
well-formed, and its traces must be linearizable. According to the construction, it is 
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trivial to show that in( CA) and out( CA) correspond to invocations and responses 
ofD. 
Lemma 2.17. All the traces of CA are well-formed. 
Proof. Consider an execution of CA and a process p. 
• For the states E start(A), pep= pc_idle. Because only p's actions modify pep, 
the first p-indexed action has to be an invocation according to the transitions 
in Table 2.1. 
• Immediately after any p-indexed invocation invp, pep = pc_inv. According to 
the Table 2.1, the only admissible action for pis a do_invp, if it exists. 
• The next p-indexed action after each do_invp is a response, if it exists. The 
p-indexed response action also sets pep to pc_idle. 
• The next p-indexed action after each response resp is an invocation, if it exists, 
because pep= pc_idle. 
D 
We next show that all traces of CA are linearizable. 
Lemma 2.18. All traces of CA are linearizable. 
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Proof. Let a = (so, 7ri, s1, 7r2, s2, · · · , sn_ 1 , 'lrn, sn) be an execution of CA and T be 
the trace of a. A complete operation in a consists of its invocation inv_op, the 
internal action do_inv_op, and the matching response resp_op. 
Let T' be an extension of T obtained by appending the response for every pending 
operation in T that has a do_inv in a. Let op1, op2, op3, · · · , opk (k ~ n) be the 
operations whose do_inv actions are in a, in the order of those do actions. Let S be 
the atomic trace (inv_op1, resp_op1, inv_op2, resp_op2, · · · , inv_opk, resp_opk)· 
According to Definition 2.14, we must show that S is a legal trace with respect to 
the data type V = (V, Vo,!, V, !); <complete(T')~<s; and complete(T') is equivalent 
to S. 
(a). Let the value of the state just prior to the do_inv action of opi in a be vi-l· 
Since only do_inv actions modify the value component of a state of CA, vi 
remains the same among all states between states after do_invi-l and before 
do_invi. Moreover, v0 is the same as the initial value in state s0 . Thus, by 
the definition of do_inv action of opi, f(vi_ 1 , inv_opi) = (resp_opi, vi), where 
in the state after do_inv_opi, its pep = pc_resp. Thus, resp_opi = resp. So, 
Vi: J(vi-1, inv_opi) = (resp_opi, vi) and Sis a trace of a legal execution. 
(b). For all i,j, if resp_opi precedes inv_opj in complete(T'), opi precedes opj in S. 
Because we have shown in the proof of Lemma 2.17 that the do action of an 
operation is in between its invocation and matching response, do_invi precedes 
30 
do_invi in a. Therefore, by the construction of S, resp_opi precedes inv_opi 
in S. So we have <complete(T')~<s. 
(c). We argue that Sip is the same as complete(T')IP for every process p. As proved 
in part (b), we can easily obtain <complete(T')IP~<s1p, where both <complete(T')IP 
and <sip are total orders. Combined with the fact that for every operation, 
its invocation precedes the matching response, the order of invocations and 
responses in complete(T') IP and Sip must be the same. It remains to show 
that every operation in complete(T') if and only if it is in S. This is true 
because any operation, either a complete operation or a pending one, which 
contains the do action is in complete(T'), and also is in S by the construction. 
Pending operations which do not have do actions are in neither complete(T') 
nor S. 
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Lynch [23] shows a proof of Lemma 2.18 for a slightly different canonical au-
tomaton, but the idea of that proof is similar to the one given here. The intuition 
in both proofs is that we can always linearize the traces according to the do_inv 
actions of the canonical automaton. Since do_inv actions directly follow the update 
function of the data type, this order of execution sequence forms a legal sequential 
execution. 
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2.4 Simulations 
The simulation method [12] is an approach for proving one concurrent system A 
implements B by showing a trace inclusion relationship between them. In a simu-
lation proof, each system is modelled as an I /0 automaton and we show that each 
transition in A has a corresponding execution in B, such that their traces are the 
same. This technique has been frequently used for formal verification of linearizabil-
ity of concurrent implementations. An implementation is linearizable if the traces 
of the automaton that models the implementation of data type 1J, are subsumed by 
the traces of the canonical automaton of 1J. To show the inclusion relationship, we 
mainly consider two types of simulations: forward and backward. 
2.4.1 Forward Simulations 
A forward simulation [12] from automaton A to automaton B is a relation fsr 
from states of A to states of B such that every initial state of A is related to an 
initial state of B, and every action of A yields a corresponding sequence of actions 
of B. 
Definition 2.19. A forward simulation from the 1/0 automaton A to 1/0 au-
tomaton B is a relation f sr ~ states(A) x states(B) that satisfies the following 
properties: 
1. For every s E start( A), there exists au E start(B), such that (s, u) E f sr. 
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2. If s ~A s' and ( s, u) E f sr, then there exists u ::b B u' for some u' such that 
( s', u') E f sr, and 
3. the external action in & is the same ·as the external action in a (i.e., either 
equals a, if a is an external action, or is empty otherwise). 
Recall that s ~A s' denotes that by performing the acti~n a, state s becomes 
the post state s' in A. The notation u =bB u' means that in B, the automaton 
moves from state u to u' by performing a sequence of actions &. If the relation 
fsr over states(A) and states(B) in Definition 2.19 is a function, we call it a re-
finement [12]. A refinement is a simplified forward simulation that is often used in 
formally verifying the correctness of concurrent implementations [5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16]. 
Theorem 2.20. If fsr is a forward simulation from A to B, then traces( A) ~ 
traces(B) [12}. 
the trace of EA. We argue that there exists an execution EB of B that has 
the same trace as TA. Let c0 be an initial state of B, such that ( s0 , Co) E f sr 
(such a Co exists according to Definition 2.19). We do induction on the length 
(rr1 ... 'Tri) (TI-1 ... rri) 
of EA. If we know so ' ' A si and Co ' ' B ci such that Co E f sr(so), 
ci E f sr(si) and trace( (rr1, · · · , 7ri)) = trace( (ir1, · · · , iri) ), we can construct an ex-
n-i+l 7ri+l 
ecution sequence ci ~B Ci+1 of B for si -----+A si+I of A, where trace( 7rH1) = 
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trace( (-fi-1, ... 'ni+l)) = trace( ('rr1, ... '7rH1) ). The base case is trivial when i = 0. 
Finally, we have trace( (-fi-1, · · · , -fi"n)) =trace( (7r1, · · · , 7rn)) =trace( EA)· 0 
An Example of a Forward Simulation 
We shall show an example of how a forward simulation can be used to prove the 
correctness of an implementation. A simple implementation of the fetch&inc using 
a GAS object is illustrated in Figure 2.6. Recall the specification V = (V, v0 , I, R, J) 
of a fetch&inc data type in Definition 2.4 and the canonical automaton CF in Fig-
ure 2.5 and Table 2.2. It is fairly easy to see that this implementation is linearizable: 
the linearization point of each fetch&inc operation is when it performs its successful 
GAS. We shall formalize this argument using a forward simulation. 
As described in Section 2.1, a CAS(X,u,v) operation always returns the old value 
stored in X. It successfully changes the value stored in X to v if and only if the old 
value of Xis equal to u. Otherwise, it does not change the value. In order to show 
the relation between the implementation and its specification, we first formalize the 
algorithm in Figure 2.6 as a concrete automaton C. Let PROC be a set of process 
and let Pcval = {pc_idle,pcLinel,pcLine2} U {pc_fiResp(n) I n E N}. Consider 
the concrete automaton for the fetch&inc implementation shown in Figure 2. 7. 
The state of the concrete automaton consists of a shared variable v, a local vari-
34 
FETCH&INC() 
while TRUE { 
1 res+-- v 
2 if CAS(v, res, res+ 1) =res 
return res 
} 
Figure 2.6: An algorithm that uses GAS to implement the fetch-and-increment data 
type. 
states ( C) = { v I v E N} x rrpEP ROG {res I res E N} x rrpEP ROG p cval 
start( C) = { s E states( C) I s.v = 0 !\ \;/p E P ROG : s.resp = 0 !\ s.pep =idle} 
in(C) = {fip Ip E PROC} 
out(C) = {fiRespp(n) In E N,p E PROC} 
int( C) = {linelp, line2Tp, line2Fp} 
Figure 2. 7: The concrete automaton that models the implementation of the fetch-
and-increment data type. 
able resp for each p and a program counter pep for each p. Each action corresponds 
to executing a line of the code. For simplicity, resp is initialized to 0 for all p. We 
use multiple actions to model those lines of code which may subsequently execute 
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different lines depending on their pre-condition, such as if, until and while opera-
tions. For example, in this algorithm, Line 2 in Figure 2.6 is modelled as two internal 
actions: line2Tp and line2Fp. One indicates the if condition on line 2 evaluates to 
true and the other indicates it evaluates to false. 
Action Pre Eff 
fip pep = pc_idle pep +-- pcLinel 
linelp pep= pcLinel pep+-- pcLine2 
resp+-- v 
line2FP pep = pcLine2 pep +-- pcLinel 
v -=/:- resp 
line2Tp pep = pcLine2 pep +-- pc_f iResp( resp) 
v =resp v +--resp+ 1 
fiRespp(n) pep = pc-fiResp(n) pep +-- pc_idle 
Table 2.3: Transitions of the concrete automaton C of the fetch-and-increment 
algorithm. 
The preconditions and effects of each action are shown in Table 2.3. The internal 
action linelp formalizes the "read" action in Figure 2.6, and line2Fp captures a failed 
GAS (where the value it wants to change is not equal to its expected value). Action 
line2Tp corresponds to a successful GAS, where the value is increased by one. After 
36 
,f' 
defining the concrete automaton of the algorithm, we need to show that there is a 
forward simulation from the concrete automaton C to canonical automaton CF, to 
show that C implements CF. To show that a forward simulation exists, we establish 
a relation fsr over states ( C) and states (CF) and an action correspondence between 
acts(C) and acts( CF). First of all, because the program counters are one of the 
most important components of the states for both automata, we present how they 
are changed and their relation in C and CF in Figure 2.8. 
I 
Abstract 
I 
I 
I 
fiRespp(n) 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 2.8: The state diagrams of process p's program counter value for both con-
crete and canonical automata and the relation between them. 
Intuitively, the connection of program counters between C and CF relates to 
the action correspondence of the two automata. A successful GAS action in C 
corresponds to a doFip, which increases the value by one in CF. Any other internal 
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actions in C corresponds to a null sequence of actions in CF. Additionally, all 
external actions are performed in the same way in C and CF in order to have the 
same traces in the forward simulation. This gives us the forward simulation relation 
in terms of the values of the program counter of process p, illustrated by the red 
dotted lines in Figure 2.8. Together with the requirement that the value of the 
fetch&inc data type recorded in both automata is the same, we have the forward 
simulation relation f sr(s, s'), wheres E states(C) ands' Estates( CF), defined as 
follows: 
f sr(s, s') =(s.v = s'.val)/\ 
(vp E PROC: (s.pep = s'.pep)V 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(s'.pcp = pc-fi /\ (s.pep = pcLinel Vs.pep= pcLine2))). 
(2.3) 
Basically, (2.1) requires the value of the abstract data type to match the value 
stored in GAS object v. (2.2) and (2.3) require that the values of the program 
counters are also the same, except that the two values, pcLinel and pcLine2, in C 
both correspond to a single value pc_fi in CF. Because local variables are invisible 
from CF, they may be arbitrary. Intuitively, this mapping captures the fact that 
internal actions: linel .and line2F correspond to null actions in CF. 
Lemma 2.21. There exists a forward simulation from C to CF using the relation 
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fsr defined above. (We also proved this lemma using the PVS theorem prover.) 
Proof. We prove that (2.1)-(2.3) define a forward simulation, according to the Def-
inition 2.19. Firstly, if s E start( C) then there exists a u E start( CF) such that 
u.v = s.val and Vp: u.pep = s.pcp = pc_idle. Thus (s, u) E f sr. 
Secondly, ifs ~c s' and (s, u) E f sr, we show there exists a state u' and a 
sequence of actions & such that u ~CF u' and ( s', u') E f sr , and the external 
actions in & are the same as the external actions in a. Because there are five types 
of action: fip, linelp, line2Tp,line2FP and fi_Respp(n) in C, we prove this property 
by distinguishing the following cases. 
1. If a = fip, let u' E states(CF), such that u'.v = u.v and Vq =/= p : u'.pcq = 
u.pcq, u'.pcP = pc_fi. We then have u fip)cF u' in CF according to Table 2.3. 
Because s'.pep = pc_fi and (s,u) E fsr, we know (s',u') E fsr. 
2. If a = fiRespp(n), let u' E states(CF), such that u'.v = u.v and \;/q =/= p: 
I I 'dl w h h fiResp(v) I . u .pcq = u.pcq, u .pep = pc_i e. et en ave u CF u accordmg to 
Table 2.3. Because s'.pep = pc_idle and (s, u) E f sr, we know (s', u') E f sr. 
3. If a = line2Tp, let k = s.v = u.val and u' E states(CF) such that Vq =/= 
p : u'.pcq = u.pcq and u'.pcp = pc-fiResp(k), u'.val = k + 1. We then have 
u doFip CF u', since u.pcP = pc-fi and u.val = k according to (s, u) E f sr. 
Because s'.pcp = pc_fiResp(k), u'.val = s'.v = k+ 1 and (s, u) E f sr, we know 
( s', u') E f sr. 
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4. If a = linelp or a = line2Fp, let u' E states( CF) such that u' = u. We 
have u ~CF u'. We easily obtain ( s', u') E f sr, because for linelp: s' .pep = 
pc_Line2 and u'.pep = pc_fi, or for line2Fp: s'.pep = pc_Linel and u'.pep = 
pc-fi. 
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2.4.2 Backward Simulations 
A backward simulation relation [12] bsr is similar to a forward simulation relation, 
but the main difference is that in a forward simulation, we reason about execution 
sequences in a forward direction and in a backward simulation from A to B, we 
start from the end of A's execution and construct the corresponding execution of B 
backwards. 
Definition 2.22. A backward simulation from the I/O automaton A to the I/O 
automaton B is a total relation1 bsr ~ states(A) x states(B) that satisfies: 
1. Ifs E start( A) and u E states(B), for all (s, u) E bsr, u E start(B), and 
2. ifs' ~As and u E states(B) such that (s, u) E bsr, then there exists a state 
(s', u') E bsr such that u' ~Bu, and 
1 A relation R over states(A) and states(B) is total if, for every a E states(A), there exists 
b E states(B) such that (a, b) ER is true. 
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3. the external action in & is the same as the external action in a (i.e., either 
equals a, if a is an external action, or is empty otherwise). 
Theorem 2.23. If bsr is a backward simulation from A to B, then traces( A) ~ 
traces(B). 
Proof sketch. The idea of the proof here is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.20. It 
also can be found in [12]. The intuition is that given an execution a= (s0 , 7f1 , s1 , · · · , 
1fn, sn) in A, we construct a corresponding execution & in B starting from the end to 
the beginning inductively. Because the states ui+1 E states(B) and si+1 E states(A) 
are related by bsr, there is a ui E states(B) such that ( ui, si) E bsr and ui -n-i~ B ui+I 
and trace( 7ri) = trace( ni) according to the definition of backward simulation. For 
s0 E start(A), by property 1 of Definition 2.22, we have a u0 E start(B) such that 
( ?ri ' ... '7r n) d t ( ( ) ) t ( ( " " ) ) Uo B Un an race 7f1, · · · , 1fn = race 7f1, · · · , 1fn . D 
Intuitively, backward simulations are similar to forward simulations, except that 
in a backward simulation, all states in the image of a state in start(A) are in 
start(B), whereas, in a forward simulation, some states in the image of start(A) 
are in start(B). This is because when we construct a related trace backwards, the 
first state of the trace should be an initial state. 
Both forward and backward simulations can be used to show one automaton 
implements another. People use backward simulations because sometimes it is more 
intuitive to show a backward simulation relation between two automata [7, 13, 15]. 
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We use a backward simulation in Chapter 4. 
Sometimes, to show that an automaton C implements another automaton A, we 
create an intermediate automaton B and show a forward simulation from C to B and 
a backward simulation from B to A. Together, these imply traces(C) ~ traces(A). 
This approach is called a hybrid forward and backward simulation. [12] 
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3 Non-blocking Binary Search Trees and a 
Simplified Algorithm 
A binary search tree (BST) [25) is one of the most fundamental data structures used 
in the traditional sequential setting. It can be used to support sorting and searching 
algorithms and also to implement sets, multisets, priority queues and dictionaries. 
A node in a BST with or without children is called an internal node or a leaf, 
respectively. The node without a parent is the root. Each internal node can have 
two children left and right. Every node stores a key. Node x is a descendant of 
node y, if x is the child of y or x is a descendant of y's child. Intuitively, if there is 
a path of child pointers from y to x, x is a descendant of y. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
an instance of a BST, whose nodes store integer keys. The node with key 10 is the 
root. The node containing key 4 is one of the descendants of the node with key 6. 
The subtree of a BST rooted at a given node is the tree containing that node and 
all of its descendants. For example, the nodes with keys 6, 3, 4 and 8 form a subtree 
of the BST shown in Figure 3.1. A BST must also have an importarit property in 
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Figure 3.1: A typical binary search tree with integers as key values. 
terms of its key values: for every internal node x, all keys in the left subtree of that 
node are less than x.key and all keys in the right subtree are greater than or equal 
to x.key. 
A BST can be used to implement a set data type, which stores a set of keys and 
provides find, insert and delete as basic operations. 
Definition 3.1. A set data type SET has the following sequential specification: 
• a state set S = P( Key), where Key is a totally ordered set of all possible 
keys, 
• an initial value so = 0, 
• a set I = {Find!nv(k), Insert!nv(k), Delete!nv(k) I k E Key} of invoca-
tions, 
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• a set R = {FindResp(r),InsertResp(r), DeleteResp(r) I r E boolean} of 
responses, and 
• an update function f: V x I--+ Rx V, such that: 
f(s, findlnv(k)) = (findResp(true), s), if k Es, 
f(s, findlnv(k)) = (findResp(false), s), if k tJ_ s, 
f(s,insertlnv(k)) = (insertResp(false),s),if k Es, 
f(s,insertlnv(k)) = (insertResp(true),s U {k}),if k rt s, 
f(s, deletelnv(k)) = (deleteResp(true), s - {k} ),if k Es, 
f(s, deletelnv(k)) = (deleteResp(false), s), if k tJ_ s, 
for all k E Key and s E S. 
Intuitively, find operations return true or false depending on whether the given 
key value is in the set or not. An insert operation inserts a new key into the set and 
returns true if the key was not already in it. The operation returns false and the 
set remains unchanged if the given key is already in the set. (We assume that the 
set data type does not allow duplicate keys.) A delete operation removes the given 
key from the set and returns true if the key is in the set. Otherwise, it return false 
and the set remains unchanged. 
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3.1 A Non-blocking Binary Search Tree Algorithm 
Ellen et al. [3] developed the first efficient non-blocking implementation of a BST for 
an asynchronous shared-memory system. They provided a detailed proof of correct-
ness, which was written in natural language. The BST algorithm they considered 
is leaf-oriented, meaning that all keys in the set are stored in leaf nodes and each 
internal node has exactly two children. Internal nodes only store auxiliary keys that 
are used to direct the searches towards the leaf containing a particular key. 
Definition 3.2. Given a key k, the search path for k in a leaf-oriented BST is the 
sequence of nodes (n0 , n 1 , n2 , · · · , nm), such that no is the root, nm is a leaf, and 
for 1 ::; i ::; m, ni is the left child or right child of ni-l depending on whether 
k < ni_1 .key or k ~ ni_1 .key, respectively. 
3.1.1 Implementation Overview 
To support the set data type, the non-blocking BST provides algorithms for three 
operations: find, insert and delete. All of them use a common sub-routine called 
search, which starts from root and searches toward a leaf that potentially contains 
the given key. The find operation returns true if the leaf node where the search ter-
minates contains the given key. Otherwise, it returns false. Examples of a successful 
and unsuccessful find operation are shown in Figure 3.2. Square boxes and circles 
represent leaf nodes and internal nodes, respectively. Triangles represent subtrees. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 3.2: An example of find operations in a leaf-oriented BST. (a). The find(2) 
operation ends with a node containing key 2, and returns true. (b) The find(l) 
operation ends up with a node containing key 2, and returns false. 
insert( 1) 
Figure 3.3: An example of an insert operation in a leaf-oriented BST. 
A typical successful insert and delete operation on a leaf-oriented BST are shown 
in Figure 3.3 and 3.4 .. The insert( I) operation locates a leaf node which potentially 
contains key 1 by using the search subroutine. If it successfully finds such a node, 
insert(l) returns false since no duplicated keys are allowed. In Figure 3.3, because 
the leaf does not contain key 1, the search tries to insert key 1 into the BST by 
replacing the leaf with a subtree containing three nodes. Two leaves containing the 
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Figure 3.4: An example of a delete operation in a leaf-oriented BST. 
key of the replaced leaf and the inserted key are in that subtree and their parent 
node contains the maximum of the two keys. After such an update, insert(l) returns 
true. 
A delete operation locates a leaf node that potentially contains the given key 
using the search routine as well. If such a node does not contain the given key, 
the delete operation returns false. Otherwise, the given key is detected, as in 
the example shown in Figure 3.4, and the child pointer of the leaf's grandparent 
is changed from the leaf's parent to the leaf's sibling and true is returned. This 
ensures that the deleted node is no longer reachable through the child pointers of 
the BST. 
Some coordination between processes is needed to avoid problems when more 
than one process wants to update the same part of the tree concurrently. Partly 
inspired by Fomitchev and Ruppert's linked list implementation [26) and the coop-
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erative technique of Barnes [27], the non-blocking BST algorithm uses a flagging 
system to indicate whether there is a process operating at a node. Intuitively, each 
internal node can be flagged and flags behave like a kind of lock. There are different 
types of flags used to represent different operations. When a node is flagged, only 
some par~icular steps can be applied to it to continue the operation that placed the 
flag. Other operations have to help this operation to complete before they can place 
their own flags. Every node has a field to indicate its current state. Initially, the 
state of a node is set to CLEAN. Before an insert or delete operation changes the 
child pointer of a node, the node's state must be set to IFLAG or DFLAG, respec-
tively. After the child pointer is changed, the state of the node is set to CLEAN 
agam. The state field of a node is flagged using a GAS step which succeeds only if 
the state of that node is CLEAN and has not changed since the operation read the 
node's child pointer. This guarantees that during the whole operation of a process, 
no other operations modify those flagged nodes. 
However, these flag states are not sufficient for a delete operation. Figure 3.5 
illustrates a problem when two simultaneous delete operations happen using flags 
only to "lock" the grandparents. In Figure 3.5(a), delete(5) and delete(I) occur 
concurrently. They set the states of the internal nodes with keys 6 and 4 to DFLAG 
at the same time before changing their child pointers. Initially the set contains keys 
{l, 2, 5, 7}. Then, both operations modify the child pointers of their flagged nodes 
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(b) 
Figure 3.5: A problem caused by two delete operations if we only use the DFLAG 
state. (a). delete(5) and delete(l) are being executed and the nodes whose keys are 
6 and 4 are set to DFLAG before changing their child pointers. (b). The BST after 
delete(5) and delete(l) were completed. 
and the resulting subtree is shown in Figure 3.5(b), where the leaves contain keys 
{1, 2, 7}. This is because only leaf nodes containing 1, 2 and 7 are reachable from the 
root of the BST. However, according to the specification of the set (Definition 3.1), 
the BST should contain only {3, 7} after those two deletes. 
To solve this kind of problem, Ellen et al. introduce another MARK state. A 
delete operation must set the state of the leaf's parent to MARK before changing 
the grandparent's child pointer to remove the parent node from the tree. The state 
of a node can be set to MARK only if it is CLEAN, and once a node is marked, it 
remains so forever. Intuitively, the MARK state guarantees that a node cannot be 
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set to MARK and DFLAG /IFLAG at the same time. Thus, when a delete operation 
removes a marked node from the BST, no operation can subsequently modify the 
marked node. 
Because the flagging system intuitively behaves like locks, it may prevent progress. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates an example where no more operations can be done on the nodes 
whose keys are 3 and 4 due to the crash of delete(l). The operation delete(5) gets 
blocked because it attempts to MARK the node whose key is 4. However, that node 
is not in its CLEAN state. In order to guarantee the progress property of this algo-
fl<:FLAG delete(5) 
DFLAG 4 [2:J 
Figure 3.6: If delete(l) dies, it blocks delete(5). 
rithm, Ellen et al. [3] used helping mechanisms in the insert and delete operations. 
Basically, besides setting the states of a node, every operation also stores some es-
sential information about itself in that node. Thus, if an operation is blocked by 
an unfinished operation, it uses this information to try to help complete the unfin-
ished one before restarting its own operation. To ensure that only one helper of an 
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operation performs the required change to the tree, child pointers are also updated 
using GAS steps. 
Figure 3. 7 illustrates the big picture of how the state of a node changes during 
different steps of an insert or delete operation. Its right part, included in the blue 
box, describes steps of an insert operation. Refer to pseudocode in Figure 3.10 and 
3.11. An insert operation tries to set a node's state from CLEAN to IFLAG by an 
ifiag GAS (Line 31). After that, the insert operation changes its child pointer to a 
new subtree containing three nodes by an ichild GAS (Line 41) while the state of the 
node remains IFLAG. Subsequently, the operation changes the node with IFLAG 
state to a CLEAN node by an iunfiag GAS (Line 43). 
The rest of Figure 3. 7 describes steps of a delete operation. A delete operation 
first flags a CLEAN grandparent node, changing its state to DFLAG by a dfiag GAS 
(Line 54). Then, such a delete operation may continue or backtrack depending on 
whether it successfully marks the parent node by a mark GAS (Line 62) or not. If the 
mark GAS succeeds, the grandparent node's state remains unchanged and the parent 
node's state is changed from CLEAN to MARK. Subsequently, the delete operation 
changes the child pointer of the grandparent node and then sets it back to a CLEAN 
node by a dchild GAS (Line 85) and a dunfiag GAS (Line 87), respectively. If the 
mark CAS fails, the delete operation backtracks and changes the grandparent node's 
state from DFLAG to CLEAN through a backtrack GAS (Line 80) and restarts the 
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delete operation. 
-------------------------------~ ------------------------------1 
DELETE 
DFLAG 
markCAS 
(on child) 
dchild CAS 
DFLAG 
dunflag CAS 
I 
: INSERT : 
I 
IFLAG IFLAG 
I I 
I I 
I I I 
: : iunflag CAS : 
man'k CA-S- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
MARK 
Figure 3.7: Main GAS steps and their effects of changing the states of nodes for a 
delete and insert operations. 
3.1.2 Detailed Implementation 
The non-blocking BST uses objects that support read, write and GAS operations. 
The key set U is totally ordered. To avoid special cases that would require changing 
the root, the tree is initialized as shown in Figure 3.8. We assume there are two 
Root-?\ 
[;] [;J 
Figure 3.8: The initial state of the tree in the non-blocking BST algorithm. 
special values 001 and 002 , such that every value in U is less than 001 amd 002 , and 
001 < 002 . Hence, every insert or delete operation only modifies the left subtree 
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of root. The types of objects we use to represent the data structure are defined in 
Figure 3.9. Internal nodes and leaf nodes are distinguished by the truth value of the 
type Node{ 
} 
Key U {001, 002} key 
Node left, right 
Info info 
Bool isinternal 
type Info{ 
{CLEAN, DFLAG, IFLAG, MARK} infotype 
Node gpn,pn, Zn, nlntern, 
Info pinf o, dinf o 
} 
Figure 3.9: Data types defined in the non-blocking BST algorithm. 
isinternal field of Node objects. For simplicity, both internal nodes and leaf nodes 
have left and right fields. However, for the leaf nodes, they all point to a special NIL 
Node. Every node has an info field, which points to an Info object. There are four 
types of Info objects, CLEAN, DFLAG, IFLAG and MARK, distinguished by the 
value of the infotype field. An Info object can also record essential information about 
an insert or delete operation. This information is stored in its gpn, pn, ln, n!ntern, 
pinfo and dinfo fields when an Info object is created. A CLEAN Info object does 
not need to store any further information in those fields. An IFLAG Info object, 
which is created by an insert operation, usually stores the leaf node to be replaced 
54 
in its Zn field, the parent of that leaf node in pn, and the newly created internal 
node in nlntern. A DFLAG Info object, which is created by a delete operation, 
stores the leaf node to be removed, the parent of the leaf node and the grandparent 
of the leaf node in Zn, pn and gpn, respectively. It also stores an Info object that was 
read from the parent in pinf o. (This is used by other processes helping the delete 
as the old value for the mark GAS.) A MARK Info object, which is also created by 
a delete operation after the creation of a DFLAG Info object, just has a pointer to 
the DFLAG Info object created by the deletion. 
The detailed implementations of the non-blocking algorithms are shown in Fig-
ure 3.10 and Figure 3.11, where comments are preceded by I> . Basically, all three 
operations call the sub-routine Search(k) to traverse nodes until reaching a leaf. 
The Search(k) routine takes a key k as its input parameter and returns five objects. 
At Line 2, the search starts from the root. The search goes down to the left or 
right child depending on whether the key field of the current internal node is less 
or greater than the given key k. It stops when it hits a leaf node (Line 4). During 
the while loop, it stores the last three visited nodes as gpn, pn and Zn (grandparent, 
parent and leaf node). It also stores the info field of gpn and pn. A Find(k) op-
eration calls Search(k) and gets the returned leaf node. If the key field of the leaf 
node is equal to k, it returns true, otherwise it returns false. 
Definition 3.3. The sequence of visited nodes by an invocation of search is the 
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Search(Key k) : (Node, Node, Node, Info, Info) { 
1> Used by Insert, Delete and Find to traverse a branch of the BST; satisfies following postconditions: 
t> (1) ln points to a Leaf node and pn points to an Internal node 
1> (2) Either pn.Zeft has contained ln (if k < pn.key) or pn.right has contained ln (if k ~ pn.key) 
t> (3) pn.inf o has contained pinf o 
t> (4) if Zn.key =I- 001 , then the following three statements hold: 
1> ( 4a) gpn points to an Internal node 
1> {4b) either gpn.Zeft has contained pn (if k < gpn.key) or gpn .. right has contained pn (if k ~ gpn.key) 
t> {4c) gpn.info has contained gpinfo 
2 Node gpn, pn, ln := Root 
3 Info gpinfo,pinfo I> Each stores a copy of an info field 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
while Zn points to an internal node { 
gpn := pn 
pn:=ln 
gpinf o := pinf o 
pinf o := pn.info 
if k < Zn.key then Zn := pn.left else ln := pn.right 
10 } 
11 return (gpn, pn, ln, pinf o, gpinf o) 
12 } 
13 Find(Key k) : boolean { 
14 Node ln 
15 
16 
17 
18 } 
(-, -, ln, -, -) := Search(k) 
if Zn.key= k then return true 
else return false 
19 Insert(Key k) : boolean { 
20 Node ln, pn, nlntern, nSib 
21 Node nNode :=a new leaf node whose key field is k 
22 Info pinf o, result, op 
23 while TRUE { 
24 (-,pn, ln,pinfo, -) := Search(k) 
t> Remember parent of pn 
t> Remember parent of ln 
t> Remember info field of gpn 
I> Remember info field of pn 
t> Move down to appropriate child 
25 if Zn.key::::: k then return false t> Cannot insert duplicate key 
26 if pinfo.infotype =I- CLEAN then Help(pinfo) t> Help the other operation 
27 else { 
28 nSib := a new leaf whose key is Zn.key 
29 nlntern :=a new internal node with key field max(k, Zn.key), 
info field (CLEAN, ..l, ..l), and with two child fields equal to nNode and nSib 
(the one with the smaller key is the left child) 
30 op:= a new Info object containing (IFLAG,pn, ln, nlntern) 
31 result:= GAS(pn.info,pinfo,op) I> iflag GAS 
32 if result= pinfo then { t> The iflag GAS was successful 
33 Helplnsert(op) t> Finish the insertion 
34 return TRUE 
35 
36 
37 
38 } 
39 
} 
else Help(result) 
40 Helplnsert(Info op) { 
t> The iflag GAS failed; help the operation that caused failure 
t> Precondition: op is to an IFLAG Info object (i.e., it is not ..l) 
41 CAS-Child(op.pn, ap.ln, ap.nlntern) t> ichild GAS 
42 clean:= a new CLEAN Info object 
43 GAS(ap.pn.info, op, clean) t> iunflag GAS 
44 } 
Figure 3.10: Pseudocode for Search, Find and Insert [3). 
56 
45 Delete(Key k) : boolean { 
46 Node gpn, pn, ln; Info pinfo, gpinfo, result, op; 
4 7 while TRUE { 
48 (gpn,pn,ln,pinfo,gpinfo) := Search(k) 
49 if Zn.key"# k then return false !> Key k is not in the tree 
50 if gpinfo.infotype "#CLEAN then Help(gpinfo) 
51 else if pinfo.infotype "#CLEAN then Help(pinfo) 
52 else { !> Try to flag gpn 
53 op:= a new DFLAG Info object containing (gpn,pn, ln,pinfo) 
54 result := GAS(gpn.info, gpinfo, op) !> dflag GAS 
55 if result = gpinf o then { !> GAS successful 
56 if HelpDelete(op) then return true !>Either finish deletion or unflag 
} 57 
58 
59 
else Help(result) !>The dflag GAS failed; help the operation that caused the failure 
} } } 
60 HelpDelete(Info op) : boolean { 
1> Precondition: op points to a DFLAG Info object (i.e., it is not 1-) 
Info result, result2, op2, op3, clean 
61 op2 := a new MARK Info object (MARK, dinfo := op) 
62 result:= CAS(op.pn.info, op.pinfo, op2) !> mark GAS 
63 if result = op.pin Jo or [ result.inf otype = MARK, result.din! o = op ] then { 
!> op.pn is successfully marked 
64 HelpMarked( op) !> Complete the deletion 
65 return true !> Tell Delete routine it is done 
66 } 
67 else { !>The mark GAS failed 
68 if result.infotype = IFLAG then Helpinsert(result) !> op.pn is an IFLAG node 
69 if result.infotype = MARK then HelpMarked(result.dinfo) !> op.pn is a MARK node 
70 if result.infotype = DFLAG then { !> op.pn is a DFLAG node 
71 op3 := a new MARK Info object (MARK, dinf o :=result) 
!>Non-recursively help the DFLAG node 
72 result2 = CAS(result.pn.info, result.pinfo, op3) 
73 if result2 =result.pin! o or [ result2.inf otype = MARK, result2.dinf o =result ] 
74 then HelpMarked(result) 
75 else { 
76 clean := a new CLEAN Info object !> The non-recursive mark help fails 
77 CAS(result.gpn.info, result, clean) !>Help op.pn backtrack 
78 } 
79 } 
80 
81 
82 
clean := a new CLEAN Info object 
GAS(op.gpn.info, op, clean) 
return false 
!> backtrack GAS 
!>Tell Delete routine to try again 
83 } } 
84 HelpMarked(Info op) { 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
!>Precondition: op points to a DFLAG Info object (i.e., it is not 1-) 
Node other; Info clean; 
!> Set other to point to the sibling of the node to which op.ln points 
if op.pn.right = op.ln then other := op.pn.left else other := op.pn.right 
!> Splice the node to which op.pn points out of the tree, replacing it by other 
CAS-Child(op.gpn, op.pn, other) 
clean := a new CLEAN Info object 
CAS(op.gpn.info, op, clean) 
1> dchild GAS 
!> dunflag GAS 
Figure 3.11: Pseudocode for Delete and some auxiliary routines [3]. 
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90 Help(Info u) { 
[> General-purpose helping routine 
[> Precondition: u has been stored in the info field of some internal node 
91 if u.infotype = IFLAG then Helplnsert(u) 
92 else if u.infotype =MARK then HelpMarked(u) 
93 else if u.infotype = DFLAG then HelpDelete(u) 
94 } 
95 CAS-Child{Node parent, Node old, Node new) { 
[>Precondition: parent points to an Internal node and new points to a Node (i.e., neither is ..L) 
[> This routine tries to change one of the child fields of the node that parent points to from old to new. 
96 if new.key < parent.key then 
97 CAS(parent.left, old, new) 
98 else 
99 CAS(parent.right, old, new) 
100 } 
Figure 3.12: Pseudocod~ for Delete and some auxiliary routines [3]. 
sequence of nodes (no, n 1 , n 2 , • · · , nm) that ln points to. More specifically, no is root 
since ln is first set to root on Line 2. For 1 :::; i :::; m, ni is the node that ln points 
to immediately after ln gets updated by the ith iteration of Line 8. 
An Insert( k) operation first creates a new leaf node containing k at Line 21. 
Then, it tries to insert this leaf until it succeeds. In a single iteration of the loop, if 
the leaf node returned by a Search(k) sub-routine does not contain k, and no other 
operation was changing pn, it creates a subtree containing three nodes (Line 28-29). 
After that, the operation creates an Info object that stores the information about 
the operation (Line 30) and tries to flag pn. If the flagging succeeds, the operation 
changes a child pointer of pn from ln to the newly created subtree and unflags the 
node with IFLAG state to CLEAN (Line 42-43). If the flagging was blocked by 
another unfinished operation, the search tries to help the other operation and then 
starts its own work again (Line 36). 
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A Delete(k) operation returns false if the Search(k) returns a leaf node which 
does not contain k. Otherwise, the Delete(k) operation tries to remove the leaf 
returned by the Search(k) from the BST. It consists of three.main steps: flag the 
grandparent node gpn using a dflag GAS (Line 53-54), mark the parent node pn 
using a mark GAS (Line 61-62), and change the child pointer using a dchild GAS 
(Line 87). If the dflag GAS on gpn is blocked by another unfinished operation, the 
delete helps the unfinished operation (Line 58). After setting the state of gpn to 
DFLAG, it attempts a mark GAS on pn. If this mark GAS is blocked by another 
unfinished operation, the delete helps the unfinished one (Line 67-78) and backtracks 
(i.e., performs Line 79-80 to set gpn's state to CLEAN) and starts a new iteration of 
Delete( k). Otherwise, the mark GAS succeeds and the delete operation continues 
by performing a dchild GAS (Line 85) to change the child pointer and then resetting 
the state of gpn to CLEAN using a dunfiag GAS (Line 87). 
3.2 A Simplified Algorithm 
To make our verification of the proof of correctness easier, we introduce a simplified 
version of the non-blocking BST algorithms without helping mechanisms and prove 
this new version correct in PVS using simulations. Once this proof is complete, 
we believe it will be possible to extend it to prove the correctness of the original 
algorithm. The ideas behind the simplified algorithm are the same as the original 
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one, except that if an operation is blocked by other unfinished operations, it tries 
again and until the unfinished one gets finished. This technique is called busy 
waiting, and does not guarantee the progress property. The pseudocode for the 
simplified algorithms is shown in Figure 3.13 and 3.14. 
We use Si, Fi, Ii and Di to represent the ith Line in the Search, Find, Insert and 
Delete pseudocode in Figure 3.13 and 3.14, respectively. In the simplified version 
of the BST algorithm, we have made a few changes. In the original paper, a bit in 
the word of the node's pointer to an Info object represents the type of Info object. 
But we use the infotype (CLEAN/IFLAG/DFLAG/MARK) field inside the Info 
object to distinguish them. This makes it more clear and straightforward when we 
implement the algorithm. As a consequence, we always create new CLEAN objects 
to avoid the ABA problem. 
The main steps of Find, Insert and Delete operations are the same as in the 
original algorithms. The subroutine Search(k) remains the same as before and is 
used by all Find( k), Insert( k) and Delete( k) operations. The Find( k) operation is 
exactly the same. The Insert( k) operation inserts a node containing k (created at 
Il) if there is no such leaf node containing k found by Search(k). First, it calls the 
subroutine Search(k) to determine if there is a leaf node that potentially contains k 
(I2). If such a leaf does not exist, the operation attempts to insert the key into the 
BST. From I6 to I9, a new subtree containing three nodes is created. The operation 
60 
then attempts to set the state of pn to IFLAG by a iflag GAS (110-111). If this 
iflag GAS is blocked by an other unfinished operation, it loops and tries again. 
Otherwise, after a successful iflag GAS, it changes the child pointer of pn from ln to 
the newly created subtree by an ichild GAS (113-115). The operation changes the 
state of pn to CLEAN by an iunflag GAS (116-117). 
A Delete( k) operation searches the BST to check if there is a node potentially 
containing k (DI). It returns false if the leaf node returned by Search(k) does 
not contain k. Otherwise, the operation sets gpn's state to DFLAG by a dflag GAS 
(D6-D7). If the dflag GAS is blocked by some other unfinished operations, the 
current Delete( k) loops and attempts again. After a successful dflag GAS (D8), the 
delete operation tries to set the state of pn to MARK by a mark GAS (D9-D10). If 
the mark GAS is blocked by some other unfinished operation, it backtracks (D20) 
and starts Delete(k) again. If the mark GAS succeeds (D12), the operation then 
changes the child pointer of gpn from pn to the sibling of ln using a dchild GAS 
(Dl 7-Dl8), thereby deleting ln from the BST. After the dchild GAS, a dunflag GAS 
(D19) resets the state of gpn to CLEAN. 
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Search(Key k) : <Node, Node, Node, Info, Info> 
1 Zn f- Root 
Find(Key k): Node 
2 while Zn is not a leaf { 
1 <-,-,Zn,-,-> +-- SEARCH(k) 
2 if ln. key = k 
3 gpn +-- pn 
4 pn +-Zn 
5 gpinfo f- pinfo 
6 pinf o +-- pn. info 
7 if k < ln. key 
8 Zn +-- pn. left 
9 else Zn f- pn. right 
} 
Insert (Key k) : boolean 
return true 
else return false 
1 nN ode f- newNode(key+- k, isleaff- true, isinternalf- false) 
while TRUE { 
2 <-,pn, ln,pinfo, -> f- SEARCH(k) 
3 lnk +--Zn.key 
4 if lnk = k 
return false 
5 if pinf o.inf otype = CLEAN { 
6 nSib f- newSib(keyf- lnk, isleaff- true, isinternal+- false) 
7 if k > lnk 
8 nlntern f- newlntern(keyf- k, left+- nSib, right+- nNode, 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
} 
} 
isleaff- false, isinternalf- true) 
else 
nlntern f- newlntern(key f- lnk, left+- nNode, right+- nSib, 
isleaf+- false, isinternal+- true) 
op f- newIInfo(IFLAG,pn, Zn, nlntern) 
result f- CAS(pn.info,pinfo, op) 
if result= pinf o { 
} 
if op.nlntern.key < op.pn.key 
CAS(op.pn.left, op.Zn, op.nlntern) 
else CAS(op.pn.right, op.Zn, op.nlntern) 
clean f- newCinfo( CLEAN, - , - , - ) 
CAS(op.pn.info, op, clean) 
return true 
Figure 3.13: Pseudocode for Search and Find operations. 
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Delete(Key k) : boolean 
while TRUE { 
1 <gpn,pn,ln,pinfo,gpinfo> +- SEARCH(k) 
2 lnk +-Zn.key 
3 if lnk =I- k 
return false 
4 if gpinf o.infotype = CLEAN { 
5 if pinf o.infotype = CLEAN { 
6 opl +- newDinfo(DFLAG, gpn,pn, ln,pinfo) 
7 result+- CAS(gpn.inf o, gpinf o, opl) 
8 if result= gpinf o { 
9 op2 +- newMinfo(MARK, dinfo +- opl) 
10 result+- CAS(opl.pn.inf o, opl.pinf o, op2) 
11 clean +- newCinfo( CLEAN, - , - , - ) 
12 if result= opl.pinf o 
13 if opl.pn.right = opl.ln 
14 other +- opl.pn.left 
15 else other +- opl.pn.right 
16 if other.key < opl.gpn.key 
17 CAS(opl.gpn.left, opl.pn, other) 
18 else CAS(opl.gpn.right, opl.pn, other) 
19 CAS(opl.gpn.inf o, opl, clean) 
return true } 
else { 
20 CAS(opl.gpn.inf o, opl, clean) 
} } } } 
} 
Figure 3.14: Pseudocode for Delete operations. 
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4 Modelling the Algorithms 
In order to prove the correctness of the simplified BST algorithm using PVS, we 
model the implementation and the specification as automata which are called the 
concrete automaton and canonical automaton, respectively. To make the proof eas-
ier, we introduce an intermediate automaton and use a hybrid forward and backward 
simulation to prove correctness. We show that the concrete automaton implements 
the intermediate one via a forward simulation and the intermediate automaton im-
plements the canonical one via a backward simulation. 
4.1 The Canonical Automaton 
The canonical automaton models the abstract specifications of the SET data type 
defined in Definition 3.1. By using the method introduced in Section 2.3.2, we can 
build the canonical automaton easily. 
As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, let U be a totally ordered set and U Plus = 
U U { ooi, 002 } such that every value in U is less than 001 and 002 and 001 < 002 . 
Intuitively, U contains all possible keys that can be inserted into the data structure. 
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Let PROC be a finite set of processes. Let Pcval be the set of all possible values 
for the program counter of a process. More precisely, we define Pcval as follows. 
Pcval = { idle, 
pcDoFind( k), pcFindResp( true), pcFindResp(f alse), 
pcDoI nsert( k), pc! nsertResp( true), pc! nsertResp(f alse), 
pcDoDelete(k),pcDeleteResp(true),pcDeleteResp(false) I k EU}· 
The state of the canonical automaton Abs A ut is a pair: (keys, pc), where keys ~ U 
and pc: P ROG --7 Pcval. The initial state start in the canonical automaton Ab-
sAut has start.keys= r/J and start.pc(p) = pc_idle for all p E P ROG. In PVS, we 
model a state of the A bsA ut as follows: 
state: TYPE= {keys: setof[U], 
pc: [PROG -t Pcval] }. 
P ROG is modelled as subset of the natural numbers from 0 to some n ~ 1 in 
PVS. We use setof [U] to model a set whose elements are all in U. Thus, state.keys 
records the set of keys the BST currently contains, and state.pc records the program 
counter of each process. 
Figure 4.1 shows all external and internal actions for AbsAut. For each kind of 
operation, two different internal actions are used to capture the linearization points 
65 
in(AbsAut) 
PROC} 
·l 
{findlnvp(k), insertlnvp(k), deletelnvp(k) I k E U,p E 
out(AbsAut) = {findRespp(r), insertRespp(r), deleteRespp(r) I r E boolean, 
p E PROC} 
int(AbsAut) = { doFindTp(k), doFindFp(k), dolnsertTp(k), dolnsertFp(k), 
doDeleteTp(k),doDeleteFp(k) I k E U,p E PROC} 
Figure 4.1: Actions of the canonical automaton AbsAut for a SET data type. 
of operations that return true or false. All transitions for the AbsAut are defined 
in Table 4.1. To make the description similar to our formalization in PVS, we use 
keys.add(k) or keys.remove(k) to represent adding or removing an element k from 
a set keys. 
4.2 The Concrete Automaton 
The concrete automaton ConcAut is used to represent the implementation. This 
automaton models the pseudocode we described in Figure 3.13 and 3.14. More 
details of modelling the ConcAut in PVS can be found in our PVS scripts. We only 
discuss some key parts of the modelling here. 
A state of ConcAut contains four parts: program counters, local variables, shared 
objects in shared memory and auxiliary variables. The program counter of a process 
records which line of code the process will next execute. We define a set Pcval 
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Action Precondition Effect 
find!nv(k,p) s.pc(p) =idle s.pc(p) ~ pcDoFind(k) 
doFindT(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) s.pc(p) ~ pcFindResp(true) 
k Es.keys 
doFindF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) s.pc(p) ~ pcFindResp(f alse) 
k ~ s.keys 
findResp(r,p) s.pc(p) = pcFindResp(r) s.pc(p) ~ idle 
insert! nv( k, p) s.pc(p) =idle s.pc(p) ~ pcDoinsert(k) 
do! nsertT( k, p) s.pc(p) = pcDoinsert(k) s.pc(p) r pclnsertResp(true) 
k ~ s.keys s.keys.add(k) 
doinsertF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoinsert(k) s.pc(p) ~ pclnsertResp(Jalse) 
k Es.keys 
insert Resp( r, p) s. pc(p) = pc! nsertResp( r) s.pc(p) ~idle 
delete!nv(k,p) s.pc(p) =idle s. pc(p) ~ pcDoDelete( k) 
do! nsertT( k, p) s.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k) s. pc(p) r pcDeleteResp( true) 
k Es.keys s.keys.remove(k) 
doDeleteF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k) s.pc(p) r pcDeleteResp(f alse) 
k tf:. s.keys 
deleteResp(r,p) s. pc(p) = pcDeleteResp( r) s.pc(p) ~idle 
Table 4.1: Transitions of the canonical automaton AbsAut, wheres is a variable of 
TYPE state, k is an element of U and Pis an element of P ROG. 
of possible values for a process's program counter. Intuitively, each line of the 
pseudocode is modelled as an element in Pcval. 
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Pcval = { idle, 
pcSearchl,pcSearch2,··· ,pcSearch9, 
pcFindl, pcFind2, pcFindResp( r), 
pc! nsert 1, pc! nsert2, · · · , pc! nsert 17, pc! nsertResp( r), 
pcDel etel, pcDelete2, · · · , pcDelete20, pcDeleteResp( r) I r E boolean } . 
Then, the component pc of the state of ConcAut is a function pc: P ROG -----+ Pcval. 
The way to model shared objects in ConcAut is a bit tricky. Node and Info 
objects which are defined in Figure 3.9 are modelled as two abstract types in PVS 
called Node and Info. Their fields, such as the child pointers of a node, the key 
field of a node or the leaf field of an Info object are modelled as functions from 
Node (Info) to the desired type. For clarity, the name of each field has a "f" as 
suffix. Thus, shared variables are modelled by the functions described in Table 4.2. 
One can easily construct the types in Table 4.2 from Figure 3.9. The Flag type 
is defined by: Flag TYPE= {CLEAN, DFLAG, IFLAG, MARK}, as described in 
Section 3.1.2. 
In order to record the local information of each process, each local variable is 
modelled by a component of the state in ConcAut. Because these variables are local, 
they are modelled as functions from processes to the appropriate type, as listed in 
Table 4.3. 
68 
Node object Info object 
shared variable function shared variable function 
keyf Node ---+ UPlus infotypef Info ---+ Flag 
leftf Node ---+ Node gpnf Info ---+ Node 
rightf Node ---+ Node pnf Info ---+ Node 
infof Node ---+ Info lnf Info ---+ Node 
isinternf Node ---+ boolean nlnternf Info ---+ Node 
pinfof Info ---+ Info 
dinfo Info ---+ Info 
Table 4.2: Representing fields of shared objects in the state of ConcAut. 
local variable function local variable function 
reLaddr PROC---+ pc_return k PROC---+ U 
lnk PROC ---+ UPlus pn PROC---+ Node 
gpn PROC ---+ Node ln PROC---+ Node 
other PROC ---+ Node result PROC ---+ Info 
gpinfo PROC---+ Info pinfo PROC---+ Info 
op PROC ---+ Info opl PROC ---+ Info 
op2 PROC ---+ Info clean PROC ---+ Info 
nSib PROC ---+ Node nlntern PROC---+ Node 
Table 4.3: Local variables of a state in ConcAut. 
All local variables in Table 4.3 are straightforward to obtain from the simpli-
fied algorithm, except for ret_addr. This local variable is used when the search 
subroutine is invoked and it records where to continue from if the subroutine com-
pletes. Hence, pc_return = {pcFind2,pcinsert3,pcDelete2} ~ Pcval. The states 
of ConcAut also include auxiliary variables: aux_keys ~ U, aux_seen_in, aux_seen_out 
: P ROG ---+ boolean. They do not model anything in the pseudocode, but are used 
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to simplify our proofs. They are discussed in Section 4.4. 
The initial state of ConcAut is defined as follows: 
* Most local variables are initialized to NIL, except that for all p : pc(p )=idle, 
lnk(p)=oo2. 
* The value of some fields of shared objects, namely the keyf and isinternf fields 
of a Node object and the infotypef field of an Info object, is not specified. 
Their initial value are irrelevant to some lemmas we need to prove later. 
* Most fields of shared objects are initialized to NIL, except three shared Node 
objects listed in Table 4.4 and three Info objects listed in Table 4.5. 
* The initial values of auxiliary variables are: aux_keys = 0, aux_seen_in(p) = 
false, aux_seen_out(p) =false for all p E P ROG. (More details are discussed 
in Section 4.4.) 
There are three allocated Nodes: root and its two children (nlnfl and nlnf2) in an 
initial state, as well as the Info objects that belong to them (CLl, CL2 and CL3). 
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the idea of building the ConcAut is straightforward: 
each line of the code, which contains at most one shared memory access, is modelled 
by a single internal action except for an if statement, a test of the exit condition of 
a while loop or a C AS operation. Each of those three types of lines are modelled by 
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field f value of f(root) value of f(nlnfl) value of f(nlnf2) 
keyf 002 001 002 
leftf ninfl NIL NIL 
rightf nlnf2 NIL NIL 
infof CLl CL2 CL3 
isinternf true false false 
Table 4.4: Initial state of root and its two children. 
field f value of f( CLl) value of f(CL2) value of f ( CL3) 
infotypef CLEAN CLEAN CLEAN 
gpnf NIL NIL NIL 
pnf NIL NIL NIL 
Inf NIL NIL NIL 
nlnternf NIL NIL NIL 
pinfof NIL NIL NIL 
dinfo NIL NIL NIL 
Table 4.5: Initial state of Info objects belong to root and its two children. 
two actions: a successful one and a failed one. However, there are some actions in 
our concrete automaton consisting of several shared memory access. That is allowed, 
because only one of them accesses a changeable field, and the others are reading from 
unchangeable fields. Hence, it does not matter if we collapse steps that read from 
unchangeable fields into one action. For instance, when an Info object is created, the 
values of its fields remain unchanged. Hence, each of Lines 114, 115, 117, DlO, Dl 7, 
Dl8, Dl9 and D20 can be regarded as an atomic action in our concrete automaton, 
thereby simplifying our model of the concrete automaton. In addition to the internal 
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actions, for each kind of operation, we define two external actions: an invocation and 
a response action. In the same way we modelled the implementation of the fetch-
and-increment object in Table 2.3, we model the BST algorithm as follows. Most 
of steps in the pseudocode can be trivially translated into a transition in ConcAut, 
except for a few cases. All three operations (find, insert and delete) invoke the 
search subroutine. When the invocation of process p occurs, we set reLaddr(p) 
to the appropriate return address, while changing pc(p) to pcS earchl. Another 
interesting case is to model an allocation step in the pseudocode. We introduce 
two new variables allocatedN ode and allocated! nf o in the state of ConcAut, which 
maintain a set of used Nodes and Info objects, respectively. Hence, whenever an 
allocation step for a Node is performed by a process p, we pick a node that is not in 
allocatedN ode q,nd return the node to p, add the node to allocatedN ode, and then 
assign appropriate values to its fields. This can be done by assuming an axiom that 
there are always infinitely many unallocated nodes to pick. Allocation of an Info 
object is done in the same way. 
Table 4.6 shows some examples of modelling lines of the pseudocode. Whenever 
an invocation is performed at state s by a process p, the key k is saved into the local 
variable s.k(p). The function newNode shown in Figure 4.2 behaves exactly as we 
discussed above. More precisely, when p creates a new nN ode at Line I1, it picks 
an unused Node object n and Info object x and adds them into allocatedNode and 
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allocatedlnfo set, sets the type of x to CLEAN, points inf of(n) to x, assigns the 
node a key value and sets isinternf(n) to false. If p creates a MARK Info object 
through the newMinfo function that has three parameters, p picks an unused Info 
object x and adds it into the allocatedlnfo set, sets infotypef(x) to MARK, points 
dinf of(x) to an Info object and returns this newly allocated MARK Info object to 
op2(p). 
newNode(c: state,p: PROC,k: U): 
LET n = getNode(c), x = getlnfo(c). 
c.allocatedN ode. add ( n) 
c.allocatedinfo.add(x) · 
c.infotypef( x) +--- CLEAN 
c.infof ( n) +--- x 
c.isinternf(n) +--- false 
c.keyf(n) +--- k 
c.nNode(p) +--- n 
newMinfo(c: state,p: PROC, dinfo: Info) : 
LET x = getlnfo(c). 
c.allocatedlnfo.add ( x) 
c.infotypef( x) +--- MARK 
c.dinfof(x) +--- dinfo 
c.op2(p) +--- x 
Figure 4.2: Definition of the newNode and newMinfo functions. Function 
getNode(c) picks a new Node object that is not in c.allcoatedNode. Symmetrically 
for getlnfo( c). 
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4.3 An Intermediate Automaton and Backward Simulation 
In the concurrent BST algorithm [3], some operations, such as a find(k) operation 
by a process p that returns true, may not actually "take effect" at the time when p 
determines at Line F2 that find(k) should return true by comparing k to the key of 
the leaf reached by the search. Consider the example shown in Figure 4.3 (a), which 
involves three processes. Processes q0 and q1 insert and then delete key 3, while p 
is concurrently executing f ind(3). The other diagrams in Figure 4.3 describe the 
shape of the BST, as a result of those operations. Note that, when p successfully 
finds the desired key in the leaf, that leaf is no longer in the BST. Namely, when 
process p executes Line F2 and decides to return true for the find(3) operation, that 
key is not in the BST. So, Line F2 can not be used as a linearization point of the 
Find operation. Similarly, 14 and D3 are not the linearization points for some failed 
Insert and Delete operations, respectively. For those operations, it is not obvious 
how to define the linearization points explicitly. The proofs by Ellen et al. [3] show 
that there exists a time during the search when the leaf eventually reached is in 
the BST. However, at that time, it is not known where the search will eventually 
end up. So, it is difficult to recognize the linearization point of a search when it 
happens, without knowing the future actions of that search. Hence, it is difficult to 
come up with a forward simulation from ConcAut to AbsAut such that some actions 
in ConcAut are directly mapped to the internal actions of AbsAut that represent 
74 
linearization points. Therefore, we use a hybrid forward and backward simulation by 
building an intermediate automaton IntAut, such that this intermediate automaton 
simulates the canonical one via a backward simulation and the concrete automaton 
simulates the intermediate one via a forward simulation. 
Since a proof using backward simulation is usually conceptually harder than a 
proof using a forward simulation, we chose to make IntAut as similar to AbsAut 
as possible to make the backward simulation proof easier [16). Thus, most of the 
components of the intermediate automaton will be similar to those in AbsAut. Each 
process has two additional local boolean variables seen_in(p) and seen_out(p), which 
are inspired by the work of Colvin et al. [16]. If pis performing find(k) or insert(k), 
the variable seen_in(p) is set to be true if k is in the key set of I ntAut either at the 
invocation p's operation, or k was not in the key set at the beginning but during 
p's operation some other insert(k) operation by q successfully inserts k into the key 
set of I ntAut. Symmetrically, seen_out(p) is set to be true if k is not in the key set 
at the invocation of p's find(k) or delete(k), or some delete(k) by another process 
successfully deletes k from the key set of IntAut during p's find(k) or delete(k). 
Intuitively, these two variables record whether the desired key has been in the BST 
at any time since the beginning of the present operation, with the aim of helping 
process p to determine the return value of its operation. For instance, if seen_in(p) 
is true when pis performing a find(k) operation, it means that the key k has been 
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p find (3) =true 
<lo insert ( 3) = true 
q1 delete (3) =true 
Time 
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Figure 4.3: (a) Interleavings of Proc p, q0 and qi which execute find(3), 
insert(3) and deZete(3), respectively (all three operations succeed). 
(b), ( c), ( d) illustrate how the three operations modify the binary search 
tree. (b) Proc p invoked f ind(3) and it has set its local variable Zn to the 
internal node with key 5. (c) Proc q0 runs very quickly and successfully 
inserts key 3. Subsequently, p continues to search for key 3 and has set 
its local variable Zn to (arrives at) internal node with key 3 on Line 89. 
( d) Proc qi executes a complete deletion of key 3, but after that p is 
still able to get to the external node with key 3 and subsequently return 
true. 
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in the key set at some time since the invocation of find(k). This, indeed, enables 
the find operation to return true even if when executing F2, the key k is actually 
not in the set any more. 
A state of the I ntAut is the tuple 
(keys, pc, seen_in, seen_out), where 
keys~ U, 
pc: PROG-----+ Pcval, 
seen_in : P ROG -----+ boolean, 
seen_out : P ROG -----+ boolean, 
and U, P ROG and Pcval are defined as in the definition of AbsAut. The possible 
values for seen_in and seen_out are true and false. The initial states start and 
actions for the IntAut are shown in Figure 4.4. 
We define the states of IntAut in PVS as: 
state : TYPE = { pc : [PROC ---+ Pcval], 
keys : setof [U], 
seenjn : [PROC ---+ bool], 
seen_out : [PROC ---+ bool] } . 
The actions for IntAut are shown in Table 4.7. Intuitively, seen_in(p) and 
seen_out(p) are initialized during the invocation of each find, insert and delete 
operation of process p. The response of a find(k) operation of process p now 
depends on the value of seen_in(p) and seen_out(p). An insertp( k) can decide to 
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start= {s Is.keys= 0 /\ (Vp: (s.pc(p) = pc_idle) /\ (s.seen_in(p) = false)/\ 
(s.seen_out(p) =false))}, 
in(IntAut) = {findlnvp(k), insertlnvp(k), deletelnvp(k) I k E U,p E 
PROC} 
out(IntAut) = {findRespp(r), insertRespp(r), deleteRespp(r) I r E boolean, 
p E PROC} 
int(IntAut) = { doFindTp(k), doFindFp(k), doinsertTp(k), doinsertFp(k), 
doDeleteTp(k),doDeleteFp(k) I k E U,p E PROC} 
Figure 4.4: Initial states and actions of the intermediate automaton I ntAut for a 
SET data type. 
return false if seen_in(p) is true. Such an insert can be linearized at the time k 
was in keys. Similarly, a deletep(k) can decide to return false if seen_out(p) is · 
true. It can be linearized at the time k was not in keys. An insert( k) of process p 
that returns true not only adds the value into the abstract key set, but also sets the 
value of seen_in(q) to be true for any process q that is performing either find(k) or 
insert( k). Even if the key k is deleted later by some operation, by applying these 
changes, such a find(k) or insert(k) is allowed to return true or false, respectively. 
Similarly, a delete( k) of process p which returns true removes the value from the 
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101 bsr( i, a) = ( i.keys = a.keys) 
102 AND Vp : [ i.pc(p) = a.pc(p) 
103 OR (i.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) AND 
104 a.pc(p) = pcFindResp(false) AND i.seen_out(p) =true) 
105 OR (i.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) AND 
106 a.pc(p) = pcFindResp(true) AND i.seen_in(p) =true) 
107 OR (i.pc(p) = pcDolnsert(k) AND 
108 a.pc(p) = pclnsertResp(false) AND i.seen_in(p) =true) 
109 OR (i.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k) AND 
no a.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp(false) AND i.seen_out(p) =true) J 
Figure 4.5: The backward simulation relation bsr between IntAut and AbsAut. 
abstract key set, and sets the value of seen_out(q) to be true for any process q that is 
performing either find(k) or delete(k), thereby allowing such a find(k) or delete(k) 
to return false, even if key k is inserted into the BST later by some operation. 
After defining the intermediate automaton IntAut, we construct a backward 
simulation relation between them as follows. For i E state( I ntAut) and a E 
state(AbsAut) we define bsr shown in Figure 4.5. 
As we can see from the definition, bsr contains two parts. The first part 
(Line 101) requires that the data (i.e., the keys set) of the related states of I ntAut 
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and AbsAut should be identical, and the second part (Line 102-110) requires that 
the Pcval of each process pin I ntAut stays "in step" with process pin AbsAut, with 
four exceptions. For example, Line 103 and 104 say that in AbsAut, p may already 
have executed doFindF, indicating that p's find operation will subsequently return 
false, whereas in IntAut, pis still processing the find operation and has not yet 
decided to return false. This is allowed only if seen_out(p) is true, which means 
either k is not in the key set at the invocation of the find operation, or is present 
at the invocation but is subsequently successfully deleted by some other process q 
before the doFindF is performed. The other three cases are similar. 
When we construct the execution sequence of AbsAut in the backward simula-
tion, for each action of IntAut, we choose the same action for the AbsAut, with the 
following exceptions. Intuitively, a findp(k) operation that returns true is linearized 
either at the time when the search begins (if key k is in the BST at the beginning of 
findp(k)) or at the time immediately after some other operation successfully inserts 
k (if key k is not in the BST at the beginning of findp(k)). At least one of those 
situations must be applicable, because seen_in(p) must be true before performing 
a doFindTp(k) in IntAut. Hence, key k is either in the BST at the beginning of 
a findp(k) or k is inserted by some other operations during the findp(k). Accord-
ingly, when a findlnv(k,p) action is performed in IntAut, we choose a sequence 
of actions containing the same findlnv(k,p) action in AbsAut. This sequence in 
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AbsAut may also contain a doFindT(k,p) action immediately after the invocation, if 
seen_in(p) is true in I ntAut and the f indp( k) operation subsequently returns true. 
We know the future behaviour of an operation, because it is a backward simulation. 
Figure 4.6 shows an example. 
In the other· case, when the findp(k) operation subsequently returns true in the 
future, but after the invocation of the findp(k) seen_in(p) is false, we linearize 
doFindT(k,p) immediately after a do!nsertT(k, q) by some process q. There-
fore, when a do!nsertT(k,p) action that successfully adds k into the key set in 
IntAut occurs, we may choose a sequence of actions not only containing the same 
dolnsertT(k,p) action in AbsAut, but also followed by one doFindT(k,q) action 
for each q that is executing a find(k) operation that subsequently returns true in 
the post state of AbsAut. Figure 4. 7 shows an example of this case. 
Figure 4.6 and 4. 7 illustrate examples of how we construct states and actions 
in AbsAut step by step starting from the end of the execution. In Figure 4.6, 
the doFindT(3, p) action in I ntAut is linearized immediately after its invocation, 
because key 3 is in the BST at the invocation. However, in Figure 4.7, we cannot 
do the same thing, because the post state of findlnv(3,p) in AbsAut indicates that 
find(3) will not subsequently return true. Note that when dolnsertT(3, q) occurs 
in IntAut, we choose a sequence of actions containing the same do!nsertT(3, q) 
action in AbsAut, followed by one doFindT(3, p) action for process p because it is 
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IntAut: 
AbsAut: 
, ' 
/ ' 
,' keys=13J \ 
\ pc{p)=idlc ,1 
,' 
findlnv(3,p) doFindT(3,p) 
keys={3) 
pc(p)=pcJ?oFind(3) 
sccn_in(p)=T 
findlnv(3,p) doFindT(3,p) 
keys={3) 
pc(p }=pcDoFind(3) 
keys=(3) 
pc(p)=pcFindRcsp(T) 
backwardly 
keys~{3) 
pc(pJ=Pct'indRcsp(T) 
sccn_i~(p)=T 
keys.;(3) 
pc(p)=Pcl'indRcsp(T) 
findResp(T,p) 
,,,,.,-----.., 
I ', 
( 
keys={3~ 
pc(p)=idlc 
\.:_<ecn_in(p)=T 
---
findResp(T ,p) 
1::::-1"\ ~ ~(p)=idlc 
\,, 
Figure 4.6: A simple example of how the backward simulation bsr works between 
IntAut and AbsAut. Circles are known states and the dashed circle is the state 
constructed backwardly according to actions taken in AbsAut. 
executing a find(k) operation that subsequently returns true according to the post 
state of do! nsertT(3, q) in AbsAut. It is also important to see that states paired by 
the green dotted lines satisfy bsr. 
Similarly, a findp(k) operation that returns false is linearized either at the time 
when the search begins (if key k is not in the BST at the beginning of f indp( k)) or 
at the time immediately after some other operation successfully deletes k (if key k 
is in the BST at the beginning of findp(k)). At least one of those situations must 
be applicable, because seen_out(p) must be true before performing a doFindFp( k) 
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IntAut: findlnv(3,p ): doFindT(3,p) findResp(T,p) 
(//=!-)'\ \ pc(qJ=idlc 
' ....... __ :___, .... 
AbsAut: 
keyS={ I 
pc(pJ=idlc 
pc(q)=idfc I 
,' 
insertlnv(3,q) doTnsertT(3,q) ; insertResp(T,q) 
key~{} keys={ l key~={3} keys~{3} 
pc(pJi=pcDoFind(3) pc(p)=pcDoFind(3) pc(p)fpcDoFind(3) pc(Jl)=pcDoFind(3) 
pc(q)j=idlc pc(qJ=pcJ?olnscrt(3) pc(q)fpc:InscrtRcsp(T) pc(q)=!dlc 
sccn~in(p)=F sccn_in(p)=F sccn~in(p)=T sccn_i?(p)=T 
! 
findlnv(3,p ): 
• insertlnv(3 ,q) dolnsertT(3 ,q) : insertResp(T ,q) 
key5={} 
pc(pJ9x:Dol'ind(3) 
pc(qJfidlc 
keyS={ l 
pc(p)9x:DoFind(3) 
pc(q)9x:Dolnscrt(3) 
keys={31 
pc(p)fpcl'indRcsp(T) 
pc(q)fpc:lnscrtRcsp(n 
backwardly 
keys,,;{3) 
pc(p}=PcFindRcsp(T) 
pc(qJ=!dic 
keys={3} keys={3 i''-\ 
pc(p)~FindRcsp(T) 
''"""'"" ) pc(q)=i9lc pc(q)=idlc 
sccn_in(p J=T ' sccn_in(p)=T 
"-...__../ 
: findResp(T,p) 
: ,.----·-" 
keys=/3) (:eys={3)) 
pc(p)~FindRcsp(f) pc(p)=idlc 
pc(q)=idlc pc(q)=idlc 
I "-
, __ 
Figure 4. 7: Another example of how the backward simulation bsr works between 
I ntAut and AbsAut. 
in IntAut. Hence, key k is either not in the BST at the beginning of the findp(k) 
or k is deleted by some other operation during the findp(k). Therefore, when a 
findlnv(k,p) action is performed in IntAut, we choose a sequence of actions con-
taining the same findlnv(k,p) action in AbsAut. In addition, the sequence contains 
a doFindF ( k, p) action immediately after the invocation, if seen_out(p) is true in 
IntAut and the findp(k) subsequently returns false. Otherwise, if findp(k) oper-
ation subsequently returns true, but seen_out(p) is false when the find is invoked, 
we linearize doFindT(k,p) immediately after a doDeleteT(k, q) by some process q. 
Consequently, when a successful doDeleteT(k,p) action in IntAut occurs, we may 
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choose a sequence of actions not only containing the same doDeleteT(k,p) action in 
AbsAut, but also followed by one doFindF(k, q) action for each q that is executing 
a find(k) operation that subsequently returns false according to the post state of 
AbsAut. 
Similarly, an insertp(k) (or a deletep(k)) that returns false may be linearized 
at the time immediately after its invocation or immediately after some other suc-
cessful dolnsertT(k, q) (or doDeleteT(k, q)), depending on the value of seen_in(p) 
( seen_out(p)). 
To summarize: when a dolnsertT(k,p) action in IntAut occurs, we may choose a 
sequence of actions not only containing the same dolnsertT(k,p) action in AbsAut, 
but also followed by one doFindT(k, q) action for each q that is executing a find(k) 
operation that subsequently returns true and one dolnsertF(k, q) action for each 
q that is executing an insert( k) that subsequently returns false according to the 
post state of AbsAut. When a successful doDeleteT(k,p) action in IntAut occurs, 
we may choose a sequence of actions not only containing the same doDeleteT(k,p) 
action in AbsAut, but also followed by one doFindF(k, q) action for each q that 
is executing a find(k) operation that subsequently returns true according to the 
post state of AbsAut, and one doDeleteF(k, q) action for each q that is execut-
ing a delete( k) operation that subsequently returns false according to the post 
state of AbsAut. Because we already linearized doFindT(k,p), dolnsertF(k,p), 
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doFindF(k,p) and doDeleteF(k,p) actions of AbsAut, whei:i any of these actions 
are performed in IntAut, they are ignored (i.e., we do not choose any action in 
AbsAut for those four types of actions in IntAut). This is the action correspon-
dence between IntAut and AbsAut. 
By using the bsr relation and our explicit construction of the action correspon-
dence, we were able to show that a backward simulation exists between I ntAut and 
AbsAut. We have formalized the proof of this backward simulation using PVS. 
4.4 The Forward Simulation 
We also construct a forward simulation f sr from ConcAut to I ntAut. Firstly, we 
describe the action correspondence of the forward simulation. Most internal actions 
in ConcAut correspond to the empty sequence (E) of IntAut, except for some key 
actions shown in Table 4.8. 
Intuitively, successful ichild CASs ( insert14T(p) and insertl5T(p)) starting 
from a state c in ConcAut are mapped to dolnsertT(c.k(p),p) in IntAut, be-
cause both of these actions insert key c.k(p) into the BST. Successful dchild CASs 
(deletel7T(p) and deletel8T(p)) starting from c in ConcAut are mapped to 
doDeleteT( c.k(p), p) in I ntAut, since these actions delete key c.k(p) from the BST. 
If an insert4T(p) or find2T(p) starting from c is performed in ConcAut, we shall 
prove that the given key c.k(p) has been in the BST at some time since the be-
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ginning of the invocation, which is similar to the pre-condition for performing an 
doinsertF(c.k(p), p) or doFindT(c.k(p), p) in IntAut. If a delete3T(p) or find2F(p) 
is performed, we shall prove there was a time since the beginning of the invocation 
when the given key c.k(p) .was not in the BST. Hence, these two actions can be 
mapped to doDeleteF(c.k(p),p) or doFindF(c.k(p),p), respectively. Each external 
action of ConcAut is mapped to its counterpart in IntAut. 
Once again, f sr consists of a data relationship and a Pcval relationship. How-
ever, since it is not convenient for us to relate the concrete data structure of ConcAut 
to the abstract set in I ntAut directly, we add an auxiliary variable aux_keys to the 
state of ConcAut to represent all current keys in the BST. Therefore, the data rela-
tion part in f sr can simply require that aux_keys of ConcAut is the same as keys 
of I ntAut if we establish as an invariant that aux_keys matches the set of all keys 
in the leaves of the BST. More specifically, aux_keys is updated as follows. 
aux_keys: Intuitively, this variable denotes all keys in the reachable leaves of 
the BST in ConcAut. Initially, aux_keys = 0. The new key k is added if 
a successful ichild C AS of insertp( k) operation is performed. The key k is 
removed if a successful dchild GAS of deletep(k) operation is performed. 
Similarly, if there is a transition c ~ConcAut c' and a state i in I ntAut, such that 
( c, i) E f sr, it is not convenient to reason about the value of i.seen_in or i.seen_out 
directly from the given state of ConcAut. We thus introduce aux_seen_in and 
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aux_seen_out into the state of ConcAut and prove some invariants about them. 
The auxiliary variables aux_seen_in and aux_seen_out are updated as follows. 
1. aux_seen_out: [PROC -t bool]. The variable aux_seen_out(p) is set to true 
or false according to whether k tf:. aux_keys or not when a findlnv(k,p) or 
deletelnv(k,p) action is performed. When a successful dchild GAS (delete! 7T(p) 
or delete18T(p)) is performed at a state c and c.k(p) = k, then for each process 
q such that aux_out_affected(q,c) (see Figure 4.8) is true and the given key of 
q is equal to k, aux_seen_out(q) is set to true. 
2. aux_seen_in: [PROC -t bool]. The variable aux_seen_in(p) is set to true 
or false according to whether k E aux_keys or not when a findlnv(k,p) or 
insertlnv(k,p) action is performed. When a successful ichild GAS (insert14T(p) 
or insert15T(p)) is performed at state c and c.k(p) = k, then for each process 
q such that aux_in_affected(q, c) (see Figure 4.9) is true and the given key of 
q is equal to k, aus_seen_in(q) is set to true. 
The function aux_in_affected(p, c) is evaluated to be true, if process pis either in 
,Line Fl-F2 or Line 11-115 of the simplified algorithm or is performing a search(v) 
subroutine which is not invoked by a delete operation. Note that, p is considered 
to have completed an insert operation, if it is performing Line I17 or I18. Hence, 
aux_seen_in(p) cannot be affected. Likewise, aux_ouLaffected(p, c) is evaluated to be 
true, if process pis either in Line Fl-F2 or Line Dl-D18 or Line D20 of the simplified 
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aux_in_affected(p, c) c.pc(p) E { pcFindl, pcFind2, 
pclnsertl, pclnsert2, pclnsert3, pclnsert4, pclnsert5, 
pc! nsert6, pc! nsert7, pcl nsert8, pc! nsert9, pc! nsertl 0, 
pc! nsert 11, pc! nsert12, pc! nsert13, pc! nsertl 4, pc! nsert15 } 
OR ( c.pc(p) E { pcSearchl,pcSearch2,pcSearch3,pcSearch4,pcSearch5, 
pcSearch6, pcSearch7,pcSearch8, pcSearch9 } 
AND c. ret_addr =J pcDelete2 ) 
Figure 4.8: If an action starting from c, is an ichild GAS, aux_seen_in(p) may be 
set to true for all p if aux_in_affected(p, c) is true. 
algorithm or is performing a search( v) subroutine which is not invoked by an insert 
operation. Note that, p is considered to have completed a delete operation if it has 
performed a successful dchild GAS. ConcAut updates aux_seen_in(p) at state c for 
key k, if aux_in_affected(p, c) is true and the given key of stored in process pis the 
same to the key inserted by an ichild GAS. Symmetrically, we update aux_seen_out 
at state c to true for some process p and k, if aux_in_affected(p, c) is true and 
c.k(p) = k. Hence, by requiring that c.aux_seen_in and c.aux_seen_out be the same 
as their counterparts in a state i of I ntAut if ( c, i) E f sr as part of the data relation 
part of f sr, we can prove the forward simulation holds between the two automata 
more conveniently. 
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aux_in_affected(p, c) c.pc(p) E { pcFindl, pcFind2, 
pcDeletel, pcDelete2, pcDelete3, pcDelete4, pcDelete5, 
pcDelete6,pcDelete7,pcDelete8,pcDelete9,pcDeletelO, 
pcDeletel 1, pcDelete12pcDelete13, pcDelete14, pcDelete15, 
pcDelete16, pcDeletel 7, pcDelete18, pcDelete20 } 
OR ( c.pc(p) E { pcSearchl,pcSearch2,pcSearch3,pcSearch4,pcSearch5, 
pcSearch6,pcSearch7,pcSearch8,pcSearch9} 
AND c. reLaddr # pc! nsert3 ) 
Figure 4.9: If an action starting from c, is a dchild GAS, aux_seen_out(p) 
may be set to true for all p if aux_ouLaffected(p,c) is true. 
Thus, for c E states(ConcAut) and i E states(IntAut), the data relationship 
between ConcAut and IntAut is stated as follows. 
fsr_data_rel(c,i) = (c.aux_keys = i.keys) A (c.aux_seen_in = i.seen_in) 
A (c.aux_seen_out = i.seen_out). (4.1) 
In addition to the data relation in f sr, there is also a program counter rela-
ti on. For c E state( C oncA ut) and i E state( I ntA ut), the program counter re-
la ti on is defined in Figure 4.10. Relation f sr_pc_rel_f ind( c, i, p) describes that p 
is performing a find operation in ConcAut and p is performing a corresponding 
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f sr _pc_rel( c, i) = \;/ p: f sr _pc_reLfind(c, i,p) 
OR fsr_pc_reLinsert(c,i,p) 
0 R f sr _pc_reLdelete( c, i, p) 
!' 
OR ( inSearch(c,p) AND c.reLaddrp = pcFind2 AND i.pep = pcDoFind(c.kp) ) 
OR ( inSearch(c,p) AND c.reLaddrp = pclnsert3 AND i.pep = pcDolnsert(c.kp) ) 
OR ( inSearch(c,p) AND c.reLaddrp = pcDelete2 AND i.pep = pcDoDelete(c.kp) ) 
Figure 4.10: Program counter relation of f sr. 
find operation in IntAut. This relation is also shown in Figure 4.11. Relations 
f sr _pc_reLinsert( c, i, p) and f sr _pc_reLdelete( c, i, p) describing the program counter 
relations for an insert and delete operation are defined in a similar way. They are 
shown in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14, repectively. Details of the three relations 
fsr_pc_reLfind{c,i,p), fsr_pc_reLinsert{c,i,p) and fsr_pc_rel_delete(c,i,p) are shown in 
Figure 4.12. 
Intuitively, if (c,i) E fsr_pc_rel, then for every processp, fsr_pc_reLfind(c,i,p) 
is satisfied, or f sr _pc_rel_insert( c, i, p) is satisfied, or f sr _pc_rel_delete( c, i, p) is 
satisfied. Otherwise, it is in the case that process pis performing a search subroutine 
as shown in Figure 4.15: if the search is invoked by a find operation in ConcAut 
then i.pcp = pcDoFind(c.kp) is true in IntAut, or if the search is invoked by 
an insert operation in ConcAut then i.pep = pcDoinsert(c.kp) is true in IntA'ut, 
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IntAut 
\ 
I 
findResp(r,p) 
\ 
\ 
\ I 
I 
I 
I 
1· 
Figure 4.11: Program counter relation during the findp(k) operation in the forward 
simulation relation. 
otherwise (the search is invoked by a delete operation), i.pcp = pcDoDelete( c.kp) 
should be true in I ntAut. Overall, a forward simulation relation f sr is defined as 
follows. 
fsr(c,i) f sr_data_rel( c, i) /\ f sr_pc_rel( c, i). 
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Action Precondition Effect 
findinv(k,p) s.pc(p) =idle s.pc(p) +-- pcFindl 
s.k(p) +-- k 
aux_seen_in(p) +-- (k E s.aux_keys) 
aux_seen_out(p) +-- (k fJ. s.aux_keys) 
findl(p) s.pc(p) = pcFindl s.pc(p) +-- pcSearchl 
s.reLaddr(p) +-- pcFind2 
find2T(p) s.pc(p) = pcFind2 s. pc(p) +-- pcFindResp( true) 
AND s.keyf(s.ln(p)) = s.k(p) 
find2F(p) s.pc(p) = pcFind2 s.pc(p) +-- pcFindResp(f alse) 
AND s.keyf(s.ln(p)) -/= s.k(p) 
findResp(r, p) s. pc(p) = pcFindResp( r) s.pc(p) +--idle 
insertinv(k,p) s.pc(p) = idle s.pc(p) +-- pcinsertl 
aux_seen_in(p) +-- (k E s.aux_keys) 
s.k(p) +-- k 
insertl(p) s.pc(p) = pclnsertl s.pc(p) +-- pclnsert2 
s.nNode(p) +-- newNode(s,p, s.k(p)) 
insert2(p) s.pc(p) = pc!nsert2 s.pc(p) +-- pcSearchl 
s.ret_addr(p) +-- pc! nsert3 
insert14T(p) s.pc(p) = pc! nsert14 s.pc(p) +-- pclnsert16 
AND s.lnf(s.op(p)) = s.aux_keys.add( s.k(p)) 
s.leftf(s.pnf(s.op(p))) FOR EACH q E PROC: 
IF (s.k(q) = s.k(p) 
AND aux_in_affected ( q ,s)) 
THEN s.aux_seen_in( q) +-- true 
insertResp( r, p) s. pc(p) = pc! nsertResp( r) s.pc(p) +--idle 
delete! nv( k, p) s.pc(p) = idle s.pc(p) +-- pcDeletel 
aux_seen_out(p) +-- (k fJ. s.aux_keys) 
s.k(p) +-- k 
delete9(p) s.pc(p) = pcDelete9 s. pc(p) +-- pcDeletelO 
s.opl(p) +-- newMinfo(s,p, s.opl(p)) 
deletel 7T(p) s.pc(p) = pcDeletel 7 s.pc(p) +-- pcDelete19 
AND s.pnf(s.opl(p)) = s.aux_keys.remove( s.k(p)) 
s.leftf( s.gpnf(s.opl (p))) FOR EACH q E PROC: 
IF (s.k(q) = s.k(p) 
AND aux_out_affected(q,s)) 
THEN s.aux_seen_out(q) +--true 
deleteResp(r,p) s.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp(r) s.pc(p) +--idle 
Table 4.6: Some transitions for the concrete automaton ConcAut, where s is a state 
of ConcAut. 
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Action Precondition Effect 
findlnv(k,p) s.pc(p) = idle s.pc(p) +-- pcDoFind(k) 
seen:...in(p) +-- (k Es.keys) 
seen_out(p) +-- (k ¢.s.keys) 
doFindT(k, p) s.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) s.pc(p) +-- pcFindResp(true) 
AND s.seen_in(p) 
doFindF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoFind(k) s.pc(p) +-- pcFindResp(false) 
AND s.seen_out(p) 
findResp(r, p) s.pc(p) = pcFindResp(r) s.pc(p) +-- idle 
insertlnv(k,p) s.pc(p) = idle s.pc(p) +-- pcDoinsert(k) 
seen_in(p) +-- (k Es.keys) 
doinsertT(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDolnsert(k) s.pc(p) +-- pclnsertResp(true) 
AND k ¢. s.keys s .keys .add( k) 
FOR EACH q E PROC: 
IF (s.pc(q) = pcDoFind(k) 
OR s.pc(q) = pcDoinsert(k)) 
THEN s.seen_in(q) +--true 
doinsertF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoinsert(k) s.pc(p) +-- pcinsertResp(false) 
AND s.seen_in(p) 
insertResp(r, p) s.pc(p) = pclnsertResp(r) s.pc(p) +--idle 
delete! nv(k, p) s.pc(p) = idle s.pc(p) +-- pcDoDelete(k) 
seen_out(p) +-- (k ¢.s.keys) 
doDeleteT(k, p) s.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k) s.pc(p) +-- pcDeleteResp(true) 
AND k E s.keys s.keys.remove(k) 
FOR EACH q: 
IF (s.pc(q) = pcDoFind(k) 
OR s.pc(q) = pcDoDelete(k)) 
THEN s.seen_out(q) +--true 
doDeleteF(k,p) s.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k) s.pc(p) +-- pcDeleteResp(false) 
AND s.seen_out(p) 
deleteResp(r,p) s.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp(r) s.pc(p) +-- idle 
Table 4.7: Transitions for the intermediate automaton IntAut, wheres is the vari-
able of TYPE state of IntAut. 
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Actions in ConcAut starting from c Actions in I ntA ut 
find2T(p) doFindT( c.k(p), p) 
find2F(p) doFindF( c.k(p), p) 
insert4T(p) do! nsertF( c.k(p), p) 
insert14T(p) do! nsertT( c.k(p), p) 
insert15T(p) 
delete3T(p) doDeleteF( c.k(p), p) 
deletel 7T(p) doDeleteT( c.k(p), p) 
delete18T(p) 
other actions E 
Table 4.8: Internal action correspondence between ConcAut and IntAut. 
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f sr _pc_reLf ind( c, i, p) - ( i.pc(p) = pcDoFind( c.kp) 
AND c.pc(p) E {pcFindl,pcFind2}) 
OR ( i.pc(p) = pcFindResp(r) 
AND c.pc(p) = pcFindResp(r)) 
f sr _pc_reLinsert(c,i,p) = ( i.pc(p) = pcDolnsert(c.kP) 
AND c.pc(p) E {pclnsertl, · · · ,pclnsert15}) 
OR ( i.pc(p) = pclnsertResp(true) 
AND c.pc(p) E {pclnsert16,pclnsertl 7}) 
OR ( i.pc(p) = pclnsertResp(r) 
AND c.pc(p) = pc! nsertResp( r)) 
fsr_pc_reLdelete(c,i,p)- ( i.pc(p) =pcDoDelete(c.kp) 
AND c.pc(p) E {pcDeletel, · · · ,pcDelete18,pcDelete20}) 
OR ( i.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp( true) 
AND c.pc(p) = pcDelete19) 
OR ( i.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp(r) 
AND c.pc(p) = pcDeleteResp( r)) 
Figure 4.12: Program counter relation off sr when pis performing a find, insert 
or delete operation. 
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insertResp(r,p) 
IntAut 
insertResp(r, p) 
Figure 4.13: Program counter relation during the insertp(k) operation in the forward 
simulation relation. 
IntAut deletelnv(k, p) 
deleteResp(r,p) 
I 
I 
,' I 
/ 
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,' 
doDeleteT( k, p) I 
I 
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I 
Figure 4.14: Program counter relation during the deletep(k) operation in the forward 
simulation relation. 
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Figure 4.15: Program counter relation during the searchp(k) subroutine in the for-
ward simulation relation. 
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5 Invariants and Proofs 
5.1 An Overview of the Proof 
In Chapter 4, we described the way to model the specification and the simplified al-
gorithm using a canonical automaton AbsAut and a concrete automaton ConcAut, 
respectively. Because it is complicated to construct a forward simulation directly 
from ConcAut to AbsAut, we introduced the intermediate automaton IntAut and 
proved that ConcAut implements IntAut and IntAut implements AbsAut through 
forward and backward simulations, respectively. This hybrid forward and backward 
simulation im-plies that ConcAut implements AbsAut, and hence our simplified al-
gorithm satisfies its specification. 
We have already defined the forward simulation f sr and the backward simulation 
bsr in Chapter 4. For the forward simulation (Definition 2.19), we have to prove 
three main properties. 
1. For every c E start( C oncA ut), there exists an i E start(! ntAut), such that 
(c,i) E fsr. 
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2. If c ~ConcAut c' and ( c, i) E f sr, then there exists a and i' such that 
. a ·/ d ( I ·/) f d i ===?- IntAut i an c , i E sr, an 
3. the external action in & is the same as the external action in a . 
. The first condition requires that every initial state (in Section 4.2) in ConcAut 
has a matching initial state in I ntAut. Because I ntAut has a unique initial state 
(defined in Section 4.3), it was trivial to check that every initial state in ConcAut is 
related with the initial state in IntAut by fsr (defined in Section 4.4). The second 
property was proved by case analysis of all actions in ConcAut, using the action 
correspondence shown in Table 4.8. In most cases proving the second property was 
not complicated. The exceptions were the actions in ConcAut that map to non-
nil actions of I ntAut. These are, by far, the bulkiest part of the proof because 
they required proving many auxiliary lemmas about how the concrete automaton 
behaves. The last condition was straightforward to verify according to the action 
.correspondence defined in Table 4.8. 
Likewise, using Definition 2.22, which defines a backward simulation between 
IntAut and AbsAut, we proved that the following four properties of the backward 
simulation hold. 
1. For all i E states(IntAut), there exists a E AbsAut such that (i, a) E bsr. 
2. If i E start(IntAut) and there exists a E states(AbsAut) such that (i, a) E bsr, 
then a E start(AbsAut). 
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3. If i' ~IntAut i and a E states(AbsAut) such that (i, a) E bsr, then there exist 
a' and & such that ( i', a') E bsr and a' b AbsAut a, and 
4. the external action in & is the same as the external action in a. 
The first property was proved by explicitly constructing a state of AbsAut from the 
state of I ntAut. We proved the second property for the unique initial states for both 
IntAut and AbsAut. Once again, the third property was proved by enumerating 
all actions in I ntAut using the action correspondence defined in the last part of 
Section 4.3. The difficult cases are dolnsertT(k,p) and doDeleteT(k,p), whose 
corresponding actions in AbsAut may consist of several internal actions of other 
processes. We shall discuss that part of backward simulation proof in Section 5.5. 
After showing the third property, the last one is easy to prove using the action 
correspondence. 
5.2 Proofs in the Forward Simulation 
To complete the proof of the forward simulation defined in Chapter 4 between 
ConcAut and IntAut, we must show the key actions in Table 4.8 satisfy the following 
property. 
If c ~ConcAut c' and ( c, i) E f sr, then there exist & and i' such that i b IntAut 
i' and ( c', i') E f sr 
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As we described in the overview section, given states c, c' E states(ConcAut) and 
i' E states(IntAut) and an action a such that c ~ConcAut c' and (c,i) E fsr, we 
can explicitly construct & using the action correspondence between ConcAut and 
IntAut defined in Table 4.8. Hence, it remains to construct an i' E states(IntAut) 
which satisfies i ~ IntAut i' and ( c', i') E f sr. 
Firstly, we prove that i ~ IntAut i' after constructing i' using&. For each action 
in ConcAut, we need to prove pre-state i enables &. A state i enables an action if 
the value of the program counter and the data values of i satisfy the precondition 
of the action defined in Table 4. 7. Hence, we mainly focus on the cases which 
map to non-trivial actions in Table 4.8. If the action is a f ind2T(p), to show 
there exists a doFindT( c.k(p), p) action starting from i in I ntAut, we need to argue 
i.seen_in(p) is true. This can be proved by showing c.aux_seen_in(p) is true since 
i.seen_in(p) = c.aux_seen_in(p) from (c,i) E fsr. By the program counter relation 
part off sr, because c.pc(p) = pcFind2, we have i.pc(p) = pcDoFind( k). Therefore, 
preconditions of a doFindT( k, p) action are satisfied in i. Symmetrically, we can 
prove that i satisfies the preconditions of a doFindF(c.k(p),p) action in IntAut 
when a find2F(p) is performed in ConcAut. Hence, Lemma 5.1 is needed when a 
find2T(p) or find2F(p) action occurs in ConcAut. 
find2T(p) Lemma 5 .1. Let c be any reachable state of C oncA ut. If c --t c', then the value 
find2F(p) 
of aux_seen_inp is true at the state c. If c --t c' then the value of aux_seen_outp 
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is true at the state c. 
A similar argument is applied to insert4T(p) and delete3T(p), as well. When a 
successful ichild GAS is performed, by an insert14T(p) or insert15T(p) action, let 
k = c.k(p). We have to argue that k r¢-. i.keys and i.pc(p) = pcDoinsert(k) before 
the action doinsertT(k,p) is taken in IntAut according to Table 4.7. Since i.keys = 
c.aux_keys follows from (c, i) E f sr, we just have to prove k r¢-. c.aux_keys. Once 
again, because c.pc(p) = pcinsert14 or c.pc(p) = pcinsert15 before insert14T(p) 
or insert15T(p), respectively, i.pc(p) = pcDoinsert(k) according to the program 
counter relation of (c, i) E f sr. Similarly, when a successful dchild GAS is performed 
by a deletel 7T(p) or delete18T(p) action, let k = c.k(p). We have to argue that 
k E c.aux_keys and i.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k). Hence, we need to prove Lemma 5.2 
and 5.3 for the ichild and dchild steps in ConcAut, respectively. 
insert4T(p) 
Lemma 5.2. Let c be any reachable state of ConcAut. If c ----7 c' then the 
I"+ insertl4T(p) 1 insertl5T(p) 1 h value of aux_seen_inp is true at the state c. J c ----7 c or c ----7 c, t en 
c.k(p) is not in aux_keys at the state c. 
L L b h bl 1 C A Ir+ delete3T(p) 1 h h emma 5.3. et c e any reac a e state o one ut. J c ----7 c, t en t e 
Jrf deletel 7T(p) 1 deletel8T(p) 1 h value of aux_seen_outp is true at the state c. J c ----7 c or c ----7 c, t en 
c.k(p) is in aux_keys at the state c. 
Secondly, we need to show that after taking a from i, the resulting state i' 
satisfies (c', i') E f sr. Thus, for each action in ConcAut, we need to prove the data 
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relation is satisfied between c' and i', as well as the program counter relation part of 
f sr. We again focus on the cases in Table 4.8, which are the most complicated ones. 
With respect to the data relation between c'.aux_keys and i'.keys, we know that 
aux_keys changes only if a successful child GAS is performed. The key k is added to 
aux_keys when a successful ichild GAS by process p that inserts key k occurs. Hence, 
in IntAut, a dolnsertT(k,p) action that adds k to i.keys is performed. Because 
c.aux_keys = i.keys, we have c'.aux_keys = i'.keys. Symmetrically, c'.aux_keys = 
i'.keys holds if a successful dchild GAS that deletes k occurs. 
To prove the set stored in the BST is the same as the set of keys in IntAut, 
we have to ensure that aux_keys is equal to the set of keys in the BST's reachable 
leaves in ConcAut. This is Invariant 1, which encapsulates the connection between 
the key set and its representation in shared memory as a BST. Hence, the complex 
structure of the BST in the concrete automaton is hidden by this auxiliary key set 
variable. 
Invariant 1. The set aux_keys in ConcAut always contains the same keys as the 
current reachable leaves in the tree starting from the Root node. 
With respect to the data relation between c'.aux_seen_in and i'.seen_in, and be-
tween c' .aux_seen_out and i' .seen_out, these parts of the states are initialized at each 
invocation of each operation and modified only during a successful child GAS. If a is 
an invocation by p, because c.aux_keys = i.keys, c' .aux_seen_in(p) is initialized to 
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the same value as i'.seen_in(p), as are c'.aux_seen_out(p) and i'.seen_out(p). When 
a successful ichild GAS by process p for key k is performed, & = dolnsertT(k,p), 
and aux_seen_in(q) of every process q that is performing a find(k) or an insert(k) 
operation but has not yet decided to return true will be set to true in the post 
state c'. Hence, we also need to show that i'.seen_in(q) is true in order to prove 
c'.aux_seen_in = i'.seen_in, which is required for showing (c',i') E fsr. Since that 
process q is performing a f ind(k) or an insert(k) in ConcAut, it follows that q's 
program counter value is pcDoFind(k, q) or pcDoinsert(k, q) at state i in IntAut 
due to the program counter relation of (c, i) E f sr. Thus, according to the way that 
IntAut updates variables in Table 4.7, i'.seen_in(q) is set to true by & as well. In 
a symmetric way, when a successful dchild GAS occurs, we can show aux_seen_out 
in ConcAut is also related to seen_out in IntAut. 
To prove the program counter relation holds between c' and i', we expand the 
effects of & and show that after &, the program counter values of c' and i' are 
still related. There is one type of special case in proving the program counter 
relation between c' and i'. For example, when a failed dchild GAS (delete17F(p)) 
is performed, we know that & = E, and (c, i) E f sr. However, we cannot relate c' 
to i', because c.pc(p) = pcDeletel9 which is about to return, however, i' .pc(p) = 
i.pc(p) = pcDoDelete(k). Therefore, we have to show deletel7F(p) cannot occur. 
This is because no helping mechanism is implemented, so it is impossible for a delete 
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operation that successfully marks a parent node to fail on the dchild GAS or for an 
insert operation that successfully flags a parent node to fail on the ichild GAS. This 
is formalized in the following Lemma 5.4. 
Lemma 5:4. For any execution of ConcAut, if a process p successfully performs a 
mark CAS {deletelOT(p)), it cannot perform an unsuccessful dchild CAS {deletel 7 F(p) 
or deletel8F(p) in the same iteration of the loop). Similarly, if p successfully per-
. forms an ifiag CAS {insertllT(p)), it cannot perform an unsuccessful ichild CAS 
{insert14F(p) or insert15F(p) in the same iteration of the loop). 
Combined with the auxiliary variables aux_seen_in(p) and aux_seen_out(p), 
Lemma 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 correspond to the Lemma 5.5 and 5.6 and 5.7, reproduced 
below, in the original English proof in the tech report [3]. 
Lemma 5.5. If a Find( k) operation returns true, then the BST contains a leaf with 
key k at some point between the beginning and end of the operation. If it returns 
false, there exist a time between the beginning and end of the operation such that the 
BST does not contain a leaf with key k. 
Lemma 5.6. An Insert(k) operation returns true if and only if the BST does not 
contain a leaf with key k just before it performs the ichild GAS. If the operation 
returns false, there exist a time between the beginning and end of the operation such 
that the BST contains a leaf with key k. 
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Lemma 5. 7. A Delete( k) operation returns true if and only if the EST does contain 
a leaf with key k just before it performs the dchild GAS. If the operation returns false, 
there exist a time between the beginning and end of the operation such that the EST 
does not contain a leaf with key k. 
These lemmas, which require another 25 technical lemmas, were all proved in En-
glish in the original paper [3]. Thus, we formalized their proofs in PVS to complete 
the forward simulation. For example, we needed to prove one of the most important 
lemmas which claims that in any reachable state, the data structure maintained by 
the implementation is a BST, shown as Lemma 5.8. 
Lemma 5.8. In every reachable state, the tree of child pointers is a EST [3}. 
This is also one of the key lemmas proved in the original paper ([3], Lemma 22). 
We encountered some difficulties in formalizing lemmas written in [3] and for-
mally proving them using PVS. An important difference between proofs written in 
natural language and machine checkable proofs is that a small step in the natural 
language proof in a human's mind is often not a straightforward automatic step 
in PVS. PVS provides some proof commands, such as grind, to automatically rea-
son towards a goal. However those procedures, which try repeated skolemization, 
instantiation, and if-lifting, are not intelligent enough to prove complex goals, espe-
cially when some complicated data structures are involved. In proving the lemmas 
and invariants of the BST algorithms in PVS, one must be very careful of using such 
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commands: if one uses the grind command carelessly, PVS automatically expands 
the definition of ConcAut into many cases and complicated expressions, which are 
very hard to work with. To avoid this, we have to explicitly state those "small" steps 
for humans as lemmas such that we can apply them when proving a higher level 
statement. Therefore, our PVS scriptto state the invariants of ConcAut contains 
many lemmas which may seem fairly trivial. 
For instance, Lemma 4 in [3] states that for each internal node v, no GAS ever 
changes v.inf o to a value that was previously stored there. In the proof, the authors 
state "Each successful flag GAS on v.inf o subfield sets the filed to point to a newly 
created Info object, so that this object could never have appeared in v.inf o before." 
This is easy to verify for a human: a successful iflag GAS (Line 111) is always 
preceded by a creation of a new Info object (Line 110). We may use another implicit 
fact that no other processes can write or modify the object between Line 110 and 
111 because the only pointer to it is in a local variable of the process that created 
it. Therefore, it has never been visible to other processes before the successful iflag 
GAS. However, to verify that sentence using PVS, we have to split it into three 
small lemmas as follows. 
First, we show that an Info object newly created on Line 110 has never appeared 
in v.info before, as claimed by Lemma 5.9. The definition of executions in PVS are 
discussed in Section 5.3. 
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Lemma 5.9. For any execution, if an Info object f is newly created by 110 at step 
i, any Info object accessed by any process before step i is not the same as f. 
This lemma can be proved by a contradiction. Assume that before step i, a 
process accessed an Info object that is the same as f. By applying Lemma 5.10 
and Lemma 5.11, which claim that in any previous state, if x was an allocated Info 
object, it is still in the set allocated!nfo, we know that f is in allocated!nfo. By 
applying the axiom that describes the creation a new Info object, the object that 
IlO allocated must not be in allocated!nfo. Thus, it completes the proof. 
Lemma 5.10. For any execution, if a process accesses an Info object, this object 
has been allocated. 
Lemma 5.11. For ·any execution, if f was in allocatedlnfo, it is still in allocated-
Info. 
Second, Lemma 5.12 says that if process p creates an Info object fat IlO, before 
p successfully performs its ifiag GAS (Ill) that writes a pointer to f into a node 
v, no other process can access f. This lemma can be proved by induction on the 
length of the execution. 
Lemma 5.12. For any execution and any node v, if an Info object f is newly created 
by 110 by process pat step j, and p points v.info to f by a successful ifiag CAS at 
step i' then no other process can access r between steps j and i. 
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Third, we use Lemma 5.13 to state that for any successful iflag GAS performed 
by process p, there exists a previous execution of Line IlO by p such that no step is 
taken by p in between. Lemma 5.13 can be observed from the pseudocode. Hence, 
no process other than p can access f before the successful iflag GAS. It follows that 
no v.inf o can be set by a GAS operation to point to f by any process other than p. 
Combined with Lemma 5.9, we can prove the single sentence written by the authors. 
Lemma 5.13. For any execution and any node v, if process p successfully changes 
v.inf o by an ifiag CAS to f at step i, there exists a step j such that j < i and f is 
created by I 10 perf armed by p and no step belongs to p in between j and i. 
Another kind of difficulty that appears when proving invariants of ConcAut using 
PVS is what we call code structure problems. One may get a flavour of this problem 
by considering Lemma 5.13. Since we model the pseudocode as an I/O automaton, 
each line of the code becomes an independent action. In the pseudocode, one can 
easily observe how the code is executed line by line. But when we model it as an 
I/O automaton, proving something that relies on properties of the code structure, 
requires reasoning about many independent actions, which are tied together via 
their effects on the program counter. More specifically, if we know that process p 
is executing Line Il3, we can easily conclude that the IF condition executed by p 
at Line 15 returns true, by looking at the pseudocode. However, in PVS, as the 
steps are modelled as independent actions, to prove the same statement, we have to 
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state it as a lemma and infer step by step from Line Il3 back to Line 15 and then 
conclude that if p executes Line I13, there exists an earlier step when p executed 15 
and returned true. More generally, whenever one of this kind of situation occurs, 
we have to come up with an individual lemma to state it. This is quite inefficient 
and thus we want to build the kind of general tools for proving this kind of facts 
about an automaton that models code. 
5.3 Some Definitions in PVS 
Suppose c --..::.+ c', where c and c' are states and a is an action in ConcAut. As we 
can see, besides describing properties of c and c', we also want to reason about the 
previous actions before a or some possible actions after a in an execution. Many 
proofs .of lemmas in the original paper use that kind of reasoning ( [3], Lemma 4, 5, 6, 
7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, etc.). Our first attempt to formalize a reachable state by an 
execution sequence starting from an initial state, adapted from [16], was inductive: 
reachable?(c): INDUCTIVE bool = 
initial_config(c) V (3 s,a: reachable?(s) A transition(s,a,c)) 
This says that a state c is reachable if it is an initial state or there is another 
state s which is reachable and there is a transition from s to c by performing an 
action a. This definition, although clear and simple, makes it awkward to reason 
about the actions before a given action or the actions that occur after it. Inspired 
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by [28], we use a more natural way to define states and executions. We define a 
finite execution to be a sequence of n + 1 states and n actions alternating with each 
other. 
We define a FiniteStepS eq m PVS to be a type that consists of two finite 
sequences (finseq), one containing the actions and the other containing the states, 
where the length of the state-sequence is one larger than the length of the action-
sequence. In PVS, the pair "[#" and "#]" represents a definition of a record type 
with several attributes. Its attributes, which consist of a name followed by a type, 
are separated by ",". The finseq type, provided by PVS, is a function that maps 
each natural number that is smaller than the length to an element of a generic type 
T. 
finseq: TYPE = [# length: nat, seq: [ below[length] -> T ] #] 
FiniteStepSeq: TYPE = [# actions: finseq[action], 
states:{ss: finseq[state] I ss.length = actions.length+!} #] 
If stepseq is a variable of type FiniteStepSeq, we define the function steps, which 
takes a FiniteStepSeq stepseq as its argument and returns a finite sequence of (state, 
action, state) tuples, i.e., transitions. 
111 
stepseq: VAR FiniteStepSeq 
steps(stepseq): finseq[ [state,action,state] 
(# length := stepseq.actions.length, 
seq:= A.(n:below[stepseq.actions.length]): 
(stepseq.states(n), stepseq.actions(n), stepseq.states(n+1)) 
#) 
A stepseq is a finiteExecFrag of an I/O automaton if and only if every tuple in 
steps(stepseq) is a legal transition of the I/O automaton. Furthermore, a finite-
ExecFrag stepseq is a finiteExecution if and only if the first state of stepseq is an 
initial state. 
finiteExecFrag(stepseq): bool = 
V (n: below[stepseq.actions.length]): transition(steps(stepseq)(n)) 
finiteExecution(stepseq): bool = 
finiteExecFrag(stepseq) A initial_config(stepseq.state(O)) 
Hence, if c ~ c' is the ith transition in a finiteExecution stepseq, we can easily 
reason about properties of any actions or states in the execution before ith step 
or after ith by referring to their indices. For example, Lemma 5.15 ([3), Lemma 
9) can now be formalized using our definitions about finiteExecutions as shown in 
Figure 5.1, given the definition of "belong to" as follows. 
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Definition 5.14. A successful flag GAS belongs to an Info object f, if the flag GAS 
stores a pointer to an Info object f. A mark GAS belongs to an Info object f, if 
the dinf of field of the Info object used by the GAS points to f. 
Lemma 5.15. Each mark CAS that belongs to an Info object f is preceded by a 
successful dfiag CAS that belongs to f. 
Let c ~ c'. A frequently used lemma that requires proof in PVS is that every 
local variable of process p remains unchanged between c and c' if a belongs to a 
process q -=I= p. When we. prove an invariant, we always have to prove it is preserved 
by all possible actions a. There are 79 possible actions in ConcAut. However, 
except for a few important actions, most of the actions can be proved to preserve 
an invariant by using the same proof steps. Therefore, we usually construct PVS 
proof strategies, which consist of a batch of PVS proof commands, to automate the 
proofs when we need to enumerate all the actions. 
5.4 Errors Found 
Although proving the correctness of invariants and lemmas using PVS took a long 
time, we did detect some errors in the original proof. An author of [3] detected that 
the proof of Lemma 5.16 ([3], Lemma 2(10)) has a small error. 
Lemma 5.16. The top part of the tree is always as shown in Figure 5.2. More 
precisely: 
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lemma_dflag_before_mark: LEMMA V stepseq: finiteExecution(stepseq) =? 
( V i::;stepseq.actions.length: LET alpha=stepseq.actions(i), 
p=process(stepseq.actions(i)), 
c=stepseq.states(i), 
f=c.dinfof (c.op2(p)) IN 
(markCAS(alpha) =? 
3 j:nat: j::;i A success_dflagCAS_belong_f(stepseq,j,f) 
) 
) 
markCAS(alpha): bool (alpha = delete10T OR alpha = delete10F) 
success_dflagCAS_belong_f(stepseq,i,f): bool =LET s=stepseq.states(i), 
beta=stepseq.actions(i) IN 
(beta delete7T AND s.op1(process(beta)) = f) 
Figure 5.1: Using definition of finiteExecution to formalize a lemma. 
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(a) Root. left. key = 001 , and 
(b) if Root. left is an internal node, then Root. left. right is a leaf with key 
001. 
Their proof was done by induction on states in an execution. It is trivial that 
the lemma holds for the base case, where the state is the initial state. However, 
for the induction step, let c ~ c' and assume the claim holds in c. For the case 
where a is a dchild GAS that changes the node root.le! t using some Info object 
f, they argued that after the dchild GAS, root.le! t is a leaf with key 001 , because 
f.pn.right is a leaf with key 001. Because the dchild GAS is successful, root.left 
points to f.pn in state c. They also have a lemma that proves that for any Dlnfo 
object f, f.pn is an internal node. They claimed that, it follows from the induction 
hypothesis that f.pn.right is a leaf with key 001 . 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.2: Trees showing leaves when the set is (a) empty and (b) non-empty. [3] 
This is incorrect. We agree that root.le/ t is an internal node at c, and thus 
we can apply the hypothesis to show root.le! t.right is a leaf with key 001 in state 
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c. However, the dchild GAS writes the value stored in other to root.left, and the 
value of other was assigned at a step /3 before a. In the state immediately before /3, 
we do not know if f.pn.right at this point is a leaf with 001 , since we do not know 
that f.pn is the left child of the root at that time. One way to fix the proof of this 
lemma is to use lemmas proved subsequently, which say that if a node is flagged or 
marked then no other process can modify its child pointers, and before a successful 
dchild GAS, the node is marked. However, in order to do so, all those lemmas have 
to be composed into a big induction lemma, which is a bit complicated. Instead, we 
fixed this lemma by making it a bit weaker as stated in Lemma 5.17. 
Lemma 5.17. The node root.left is always a node with key 001 . 
This weaker lemma turns out to be sufficient to be used in the later proofs, since 
we can still conclude that root.le! t.right has a key greater than or equal to 001 by 
combining a few lemmas. 
In the process of formalizing the proof, I discovered one flaw in the original proof 
in Lemma 5.18 ([3], Lemma 14(7)). Note that Lemma 14 in the original proof is a 
big induction lemma which has many parts and we mainly discuss the seventh part 
of it. 
Lemma 5.18. A child (either an ichild or dchild) GAS writes a value into a node 
v 's child pointer that has never been stored there before. 
We can focus on the case of a dchild GAS dcask that changes the left child of 
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x from a node z to y. In the original proof, to derive a contradiction, the authors 
assume that y was the left child of x at some earlier time. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
execution for the proof. In the state just before dcask, z's child is y. Because we 
contradiction 
----------x--------
Figure 5.3: The way to show contradiction in proving Lemma 5.18. 
know y -=I z, there must be an earlier child GAS ccasj that caused y to stop being 
the left child of x. They proved that just after ccasj, y is not a descendant of x. The 
case where ccasj is an ichild GAS is fine. So, we only consider the case where ccasj 
is a dchild GAS as shown in Figure 5.3. According to another part of the induction 
hypothesis "before a dchild GAS, the child pointers of the parent node f.pn do not 
change between the last read in search belong to f and the dchild GAS", so ccasj 
replaces a pointer to y by a pointer to y's child, and y is no longer a descendant of 
. x (since y cannot be a descendant of its own child by "the binary tree property" 
(another part of the induction hypothesis)). This is incorrect, because "the binary 
tree property" can only be applied here when y is reachable. However, there is no 
proof to show node x or y is reachable before the dchild GAS. 
We fix this lemma by adding more auxiliary claims into the original Lemma 14 
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to compose a bigger induction lemma. The added claims are stated in Lemma 5.19. 
Some of these claims were proved in (3], but were not wrapped up in the induction 
proof used to prove Lemma 14 in [3] 
Lemma 5.19. 1. After a successful dchild CAS by a process p, the node that was 
marked by p before the dchild CAS and was reachable right before the CAS, 
becomes unreachable and will never become reachable again. 
2. If a successful child (either an ichild or dchild) GAS occurs on a node v, v is 
reachable in the state right before the CAS. 
3. During a search subroutine of process p, each visited node was reachable at a 
time before it is visited by p. 
4. The node which is unreachable and becomes reachable by an ichild GAS was 
never reachable before. 
5. If a node is reachable after any action other than a successful ichild CAS then 
it was reachable before the action as well. 
Intuitively, Lemma 5.19(1) can be proved by two cases. In case 1, if a node is 
added by a successful ichild GAS we prove this node is not the marked node by 
contradiction by applying Lemma 5.19(4). In the other case, when a node becomes 
the new child of its grandparent by a dchild GAS we prove this node is not the 
marked node by contradiction by applying Lemma 5.19(5). Lemma 5.19(2) and 
ll8 
l' 
Lemma 5.19(3) are proved by using the induction hypothesis of each other. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 5.19(4) can be proved using the fact that an ichild GAS always 
changes a pointer to a newly allocated node. Lemma 5.19(5) can be proved by 
applying Lemma 5.19(2) plus the fact that a dchild GAS changes the child pointer 
of f.gpn from f.pn to f.other. Thus, we can use Lemma 5.19(1) to show the con-
tradiction that an unreachable node y becomes reachable in the execution shown in 
Figure 5.3, thereby correcting the flaw in the original proof of Lemma 14(7). 
5.5 Proofs in the Backward Simulation 
It is easier to prove the correctness of the backward simulation compared with the 
forward one, because our intention was to design the I ntAut to be as similar to the 
AbsAut as possible. As discussed earlier, in Section 5.1, we were required to show 
that for each type of a such that i' ~ IntAut i and each a E states(AbsAut) such 
that ( i, a) E bsr, there exists a state a' of AbsAut and a sequence of actions & such 
that ( i', a') E bsr and a' :4;,. AbsAut a, and the external action in & is the same as the 
external action in a. 
Recall the backward simulation relation bsr and backward action correspondence 
defined in Section 4.3. It is trivial to prove that external actions, which are invoca-
tions and responses, satisfy the above properties. It is also not hard to prove that 
internal actions, except for dolnsertT(k,p) and doDeleteT(k,p), satisfy this prop-
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erty, because they never modify shared objects which appear in the data relation 
part of bsr. A dolnsertT(k,p) action has a more complicated behaviour. It adds 
k into i'.keys, sets i'.seen_in(q) to be true for any process q which is performing a 
find(k) or an insert(k) operation but has not decided to return a value, which allows 
us to linearize all find(k) operations that subsequently return true and all insert(k) 
operations that subsequently return false immediately after dolnsertT(k,p). For 
this action a, we need to construct the pre-state a' from a by removing k from 
a.keys. The value of program counter a'.pc(q) for a process q is retrieved by setting 
its values to the precondition of q's action in &. Then, we show that ( i', a') E bsr 
and a' ~ AbsAut a and the external action in & and a is the same. Because a 
doDeleteT(k,p) action behaves in a symmetric way as dolnsertT(k,p), we used a 
similar method to construct & and a' to complete the proof. Those proofs can all 
be found in our PVS scripts. 
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6 Conclusion 
We believe that forward simulations are highly related to a concept called strong 
linearizability recently defined by Golab et al. [29]. We conjecture that an implemen-
tation is strongly linearizable if and only if there exists a forward simulation between 
the implementation and its sequential specification. Because we believe the BST al-
gorithm is actually strongly linearizable, we believe that a forward simulation exists 
between the implementation and its sequential specification. Therefore, one may 
be tempted to try to prove that the concrete automaton (the implementation) im-
plements the canonical automaton (specification) directly by a forward simulation. 
However, that relation is much more complicated to formalize. Even when we split 
the proof into a backward and forward simulation, the forward simulation is still 
complicated to be proved using PVS, because the pseudocode of the algorithm is 
far from trivial, the concrete automaton is complicated, and the program counter 
relationship defined in Figure 4.10 consists of a lot of possibilities. When we were 
proving a lemma about the concrete automaton, it was almost impossible to use 
PVS's built-in automated reasoning procedures such as "grind" to save time, be-
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cause PVS "got lost" in those automatic generated subgoals when auto-rewriting 
the concrete automaton. 
It seems more reasonable to use a forward simulation to prove the correctness 
of an implementation, when its pseudocode is short and simple, as Colvin et al. [16] 
and Doherty et al. (13] did. Another reasonable approach is to develop tools to au-
tomatically generate the I/O automaton model from the implementations, such as 
its program counter values and actions. The Tempo toolkits developed by Lynch 
et al. [20] can translate specifications described in an I/O automata like language 
into I/O automata and help with the verification. It would be easier to handle com-
plicated implementations if we were to have a tool that automatically proves some 
easy facts about the pseudocode. For instance, local variables are not nil when they 
are used, and process p's local variables remains the same if p did not modify them. 
It may also be useful to have a tool to generate lemmas on the pseudocode structure, 
such as when a process is executing inside an IF block, the IF condition held at some 
earlier time. This would really save proofs designers' time and let them focus on the 
more important and difficult lemmas required to prove correctness. Lesani et al. [28] 
tried to construct a general framework for formally verifying software transactional 
memory algorithms. Their framework provides templates which make it easier to 
construct I/O automata and forward or backward relations. 
We have formally verified the correctness of the simplified algorithm using PVS 
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by showing that a forward simulation exists between the concrete automaton, which 
models the implementation, and the intermediate automaton, and a backward sim-
ulation exists between the intermediate automaton and the canonical one which 
models the sequential specification. Thus, the algorithm without the helping mech-
anism is linearizable. Our future work is to verify that the original algorithm with 
the helping mechanism is also linearizable. This can be done by building another 
concrete automaton and showing that there is a simulation between this newly built 
one and ConcAut. This may be applicable since the automata for the original al-
gorithm and the simplified version are quite similar. An alternative way to verify 
the original implementation would be to model the algorithm as a concrete automa-
ton and redo the backward and forward simulation proof again. In this approach, 
a lot of lemmas and proofs we have proved in the old automaton can be directly 
reused and that will save a great deal of time. When modelling the pseudocode as 
ConcAut, we considered that accessing unchangeable fields of a shared object can 
be considered as 0 step of accessing the shared memory. We planned to explore such 
property in the future, which may simplify the way of modelling of general concur-
rent pseudo codes, thereby simplifying a formal verification. The BST algorithm 
is a non-blocking algorithm, which means that it guarantees that in any infinite 
execution some operation completes. We are also interested in formalizing the proof 
of this progress property of the BST using PVS, which may be quite different from 
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verifying the correctness property. In particular, it will require us to reason about 
infinite executions. 
124 
Bibliography 
[1] Sutter, H., Lams, J.: Software and the concurrency revolution. Queue 3(7) 
(September 2005) 54-62 
[2] Herlihy, M.P.: Wait-free synchronization. ACM Transactions on Programming 
Languages and Systems 13(1) (January 1991) 124-149 
[3] Ellen, F., Fatourou, P., Ruppert, E., van Breugel, F.: Non-blocking binary 
search trees. In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles 
of Distributed Computing, ACM (July 2010) 131-140 
[4] Detlefs, D.L., Flood, C.H., Garthwaite, A., Martin, P.A., Shavit, N., Steele, 
G.L.: Even better DCAS-based concurrent deques. In: Proceedings of the 14th 
International Conference on Distributed Computing, Springer-Verlag (October 
2000) 59-73 
[5] Doherty, S.: Modelling and verifying non-blocking algorithms that use dy-
namically allocated memory. Master's thesis, Victoria University of Wellington 
(2003) 
125 
TT----~-- - ----
[6] Shann, C.H., Huang, T.L., Chen, C.: A practical nonblocking queue algo-
rithm using compare-and-swap. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International 
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE (July 2000) 470-475 
[7) Colvin, R., Groves, L.: Formal verification of an array-based nonblocking queue. 
In: Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Engineering of 
Complex Computer Systems, IEEE (June 2005) 507-516 
[8) Lamport, L.: Checking a multithreaded algorithm with +CAL. In: Proceed-
ings of the 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing, Springer-
Verlag (September 2006) 151-163 
[9) Doherty, S., Detlefs, D.L., Groves, L., Flood, C.H., Luchangco, V., Martin, 
P.A., Moir, M., Shavit, N., Steele, G.L.: DCAS is not a silver bullet for 
nonblocking algorithm design. In: Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, ACM (June 2004) 216-
224 
[10) Liu, Y., Chen, W., Liu, Y.A., Sun, J.: Model checking linearizability via 
refinement. In: Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods, 
Springer-Verlag (November 2009) 321-337 
[11) Lynch, N.A., Tuttle, M.R.: Hierarchical correctness proofs for distributed 
algorithms. In: Proceedings of the 6th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles 
126 
of Distributed Computing, ACM (August 1987) 137-151 
[12) Lynch, N., Vaandrager, F.: Forward and backward simulations - Part I: Un-
timed Systems. Information and Computation 121 (September 1995) 214-233 
[13) Doherty, S., Groves, L., Luchangco, V., Moir, M.: Formal verification of a 
practical lock-free queue algorithm. In: International Conference on Formal 
Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems, Springer-Verlag (Septem-
ber 2004) 97-114 
[14) Michael, M.M., Scott, M.L.: Nonblocking algorithms and preemption-safe lock-
ing on multiprogrammed shared memory multiprocessors. Journal of Parallel 
and Distributed Computing 51(1) (May 1998) 1-26 
[15) Doherty, S., Moir, M.: Nonblocking algorithms and backward simulation. In: 
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing, 
Springer-Verlag (September 2009) 274-288 
[16) Colvin, R., Groves, L., Luchangco, V., Moir, M.: Formal verification of a lazy 
concurrent list-based set algorithm. In: Proceedings of the 18th International 
Conference on Computer Aided Verification, Springer-Verlag (August 2006) 
475-488 
127 
[17] Heller, S., Herlihy, M., Luchangco, V., Moir, M., Scherer III, W.N., Shavit, N.: 
A lazy concurrent list-based set algorithm. Parallel Processing Letters 17( 4) 
(December 2007) 411-424 
[18] Gao, H.: Design and Verification of Lock-free Parallel Algorithms. PhD thesis, 
G roningen University ( 2005) 
[19] Archer, M., Lim, H., Lynch, N.A., Mitra, S., Umeno, S.: Specifying and 
proving properties of timed I/O automata using Tempo. Design Automation 
for Embedded Systems 12(1-2) (2008) 139-170 
[20] Lynch, N.A., Garland, S.J., Kaynar, D., Michel, L., Shvartsman, A.: The 
Tempo language user guide and reference manual. (2008) 
[21] Archer, M., Heitmeyer, C., Sims, S.: TAME: A PVS interface to simplify proofs 
for automata models. In: Proceedings of User Interfaces for Theorem Provers, 
IEEE (July 1998) 42-49 
[22] Archer, M.: TAME: Using PVS strategies for special-purpose theorem proving. 
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 29(1-4) (2000) 139-181 
[23] Lynch, N.A.: Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San 
Francisco, CA, USA (1996) 
128 
,. "'!" 
[24] Herlihy, M.P., Wing, J.M.: Linearizability: a correctness condition for con-
current objects. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 
12(3) (July 1990) 463-492 
[25] Hibbard, T.N.: Some combinatorial properties of certain trees with applications 
to searching and sorting. Journal of the ACM 9(1) (January 1962) 13-28 
[26] Fomitchev, M., Ruppert, E.: Lock-free linked lists and skip lists. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed 
Computing, ACM (July 2004) 50-59 
[27] Barnes, G.: A method for implementing lock-free shared-data structures. In: 
Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and 
Architectures, ACM (July 1993) 261-270 
[28] Lesani, M., Luchangco, V., Moir, M.: A framework for formally verifying 
software transactional memory algorithms. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Inter-
national Conference on Concurrency Theory, Springer-Verlag (September 2012) 
516-530 
[29] Golab, W., Higham, L., Woelfel, P.: Linearizable implementations do not 
suffice for randomized distributed computation. In: Proceedings of the 43rd 
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM (2011) 373-382 
129 
